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Introduction 
 
A fundamental flaw at the heart of the corporate structure is the scope for fraud based on the 
provision of misinformation to investors, actual or potential. The scope for fraud arises 
because the separation of ownership and control in the company facilitates asymmetric 
information2 in two key circumstances: when a company seeks to raise capital from outside 
investors and when a company provides information to its owners for stewardship purposes.3 
Corporate misinformation, such as the use of off balance sheet finance (OBSF), can distort 
the allocation of investment funding so that money gets attracted into less well performing 
enterprises (which may be highly geared and more risky, enhancing the risk of multiple 
failures). Insofar as it creates a market for lemons it risks damaging confidence in the stock 
markets themselves since the essence of a market for lemons is that bad drives out good from 
the market, since sellers of the good have less incentive to sell than sellers of the bad.4 The 
neo-classical model of perfect competition assumes that there will be perfect information. 
However, it can be difficult to define property rights and establish markets in information.5 
                                                 
1 Dr Stephen Copp, Associate Professor in Law and Alison Cronin, Lecturer, the Business School, Bournemouth 
University. An earlier version of this article was presented as “Off-balance Sheet Finance and the 2008 
Financial Crisis: The Case for Deterrence Evaluated” at the Banking & Finance Stream of the Socio-Legal 
Studies Association Annual Conference (Robert Gordon University, 2014). The law is as stated at 31st May 
2014, except as otherwise stated. 
2 See generally C. Veljanovski, Economic Principles of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
pp. 40 – 41; the problem of asymmetric information arises where one transactor knows more than the other and 
as a result transactions take place influenced by fraud or deceit or because of judgment problems on the part of 
buyers who cannot assess quality without information, the “market for lemons” scenario, see B.R. Cheffins  
Company Law, Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 129 – 130. The 
market for lemons is used to refer to a market for both good and bad cars where only the sellers know which 
cars are inferior. 
3 See Cheffins (n 2) pp. 129 – 131 for an application of this problem mainly to the public offering of shares.  
4 Ibid. 
5 R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law & Economics (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 2000), p. 126. 
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Information is costly to produce and cheap to transmit. Producers have difficulty in selling 
information for more than a fraction of its value, “nonappropriability”, one person’s use of an 
idea does not diminish its availability for others to use, it is “non-rivalrous”, and excluding 
some people from it can be expensive, it is “non-excludable”.6 Cooter and Ulen conclude, 
therefore, that state intervention may be needed either in terms of state supply of information, 
public subsidies for the private provision of information, or the creation and protection of 
property rights in information.7 
 
Early companies’ legislation, in particular, the Joint Stock Companies Acts 1844 to 1856, was 
a response to such problems8 and involved various experiments involving different and 
innovative legislative techniques that were emerging at the time, for example, registration, 
information provision, mandatory/ default rules.9 Criminal sanctions nonetheless were also 
introduced to support the framework and were subject to piecemeal reform over the years10 – 
but surprisingly a generic rule against fraud was not introduced until the Fraud Act 2006. 
Despite the persistence of high profile financial scandals involving companies, the number of 
successful prosecutions involving the provision of misinformation by companies has 
remained low, whilst simultaneously the volume and complexity of regulation designed to 
combat information asymmetry has mushroomed, leading to substantial and undesirable 
transaction costs11 that undermine one of the original purposes of the company, namely 
facilitating market entry,12 potentially leading to social costs, for example, the loss of 
innovation. Such regulation can be seen to be highly path dependent in economic terms, 
implying that radical surgery may be required to resolve the problem.  
 
The current volume and complexity of the regulatory edifice aimed at addressing corporate 
misinformation is breathtaking. The institutional architecture now includes, at an 
international level, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), the European Union Internal Market and 
Services Directorate-General, the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), 
and at the UK level, the Department of Business, Innovation & Skills (DBis), the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA), the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC), Companies’ House and numerous professional associations of 
accountants.13 In relation to financial disclosure, at an EU level the regulatory framework 
includes the Fourth,14 Seventh,15 Eighth16 and Eleventh17 Company Law Directives, the 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 See, in particular, the First Report of the Select Committee on Joint Stock Companies (1844 B.P.P., Vol. VII) 
(Gladstone Committee Report), see for example paras. 7.8 – 16.  
9 See for example the development of the concept of registration through the Registration Act 1786, the 
Registering of British Vessels Act 1825, the Savings Banks Act 1817, Friendly Societies Act 1829 and the 
Building Societies Act 1836, see R. Harris, Industrialising English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business 
Organisation 1720 – 1844 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 274 – 277. 
10 See below. 
11 See below. 
12 See S.F. Copp, “Limited Liability and Freedom” in S.F. Copp (ed.), The Legal Foundations of Free Markets 
(London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2008), esp. pp. 171 – 172, 179 – 180 and 181 – 183. 
13 See generally http://www.iosco.org/; http://www.ifrs.org/Pages/default.aspx; http://www.ifac.org/auditing-
assurance; http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal_market/index_en.htm; 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/esc/index_en.htm; http://www.esma.europa.eu/; 
http://www.efrag.org/Front/Home.aspx; https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-
business-innovation-skills; http://www.fca.org.uk/; http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/PRA/Pages/default.aspx; 
http://www.frc.org.uk/; http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/. [accessed January 28, 2015]. 
14 Directive 78/660/EEC [1978] OJ L222/11. 
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Accounts Modernisation Directive18 and various amending Directives,19 various Regulations 
governing the adoption of International Accounting Standards.20 At UK level, there are Parts 
15, 16, 35 and 42 Companies Act 2006,21 supplemented by numerous Statutory 
Instruments,22 over 30 Financial Reporting Standards and 11 Statements of Standard 
Accounting Practice23 and numerous auditing standards.24 
 
Attempting to ascertain the cost of this institutional architecture and regulatory framework 
would be a massive task. It is only necessary to consider the nonetheless substantial research 
that was conducted for the Government in relation to the administrative burdens of regulation 
- the work in relation to the Department of Trade and Industry, the Administrative Burdens 
Measurement Exercise (ABME), involved a 452 page report supported by a 79 page technical 
summary.25 Generally, the ABME found that the regulation of accounting and company law 
accounted for 51 per cent a staggering £6680 million, of the total estimated administrative 
cost on business, of which the Companies Act 1985 accounted for 98 per cent.  The 
explanation offered was the existence of nearly 2 million companies in the UK to which 
information requirements applied.26 The obligation for small companies to prepare accounts 
was the second most costly information obligation, with an estimated administrative cost of 
£1139 million.27 But it was also noted that 50 per cent of the total costs had their origin in 
international obligations where there was no discretion, and 5 per cent from international 
obligations where there was some discretion.28 The preparation of company accounts for each 
financial year in accordance with international accounting standards (IAS) or the Companies 
Act 1985 resulted in an administrative burden of a very modest £57 million.29 What can be 
seen from this is that the total cost of a framework, the main original purpose of which was to 
reduce fraud, is so difficult to ascertain that there is realistically no way of estimating whether 
it is beneficial or whether it exceeds the cost of the fraud itself or results in an optimal level 
of fraud in economic terms.30 Since most of the cost of such a framework may well be 
imposed on non-fraudulent parties, this must entail significant economic waste. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 Directive 83/349/EEC [1983] OJ L193/1. 
16 Directive 84/253/EEC [1984] OJ L126/20. 
17 Directive 89/666/EEC [1989] OJ L395/36. 
18 Directive 2003/51/EC [2003] OJ L221/13.  
19 Directive 2006/46/EC [2006] OJ L224/1; Directive 2009/49/EC [2009] OJ L164/42.  
20 See, in particular, Regulation 1606/2002/EC and Regulation 297/2008/EC. The current terminology is 
“International Financial Reporting Standards” (IFRS) which are issued by the former International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB); IFRS now include International Accounting Standards (IAS) issued by the former 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). 
21 Companies Act 2006 Part 15 (accounts and reports), Part 16 (audit), Part 35 (the Registrar of Companies); 
Part 42 (statutory auditors), as well as various relevant Schedules.  
22 See, in particular, the Small Companies and Groups (Accounts and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2008 SI 
2008/409 as amended and the Large and Medium-Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
Regulations 2008 SI 2008/410 as amended. 
23 See http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Accounting-and-Reporting-Policy/Standards-in-
Issue.aspx. [Accessed January 28, 2015]. 
24 See further http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Audit-and-assurance/Standards-and-
guidance/Standards-and-guidance-for-auditors/Auditing-standards.aspx. [Accessed January 28, 2015]. 
25 DTI, June 2006. 
26 ABME Report, p. 17.  
27  Ibid p. 61. 
28  Ibid pp. 84 – 85. 
29 See Administrative Burdens of Regulation – Department of Trade and Industry” (HM Government, December 
2012), p. 8.  
30 For discussion of the concept of the optimal level of fraud see, for example, M.R. Darby and E. Karni, “Free 
Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud” (1973) 16 Journal of Law & Economics 67 and A.M. Polinsky 
and S. Shavell, “The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment” (1984) 24 Journal of Public Economics 89. 
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there is fair evidence not only that the system has been historically path dependent in the UK 
but that its internationalisation makes such path dependence more difficult to ever break free 
of, something that is likely to entail further economic waste. 
 
This article observes that in economic theory there are grounds for supposing that a general 
anti-fraud rule would be more efficient than regulation. An evaluation of such complex 
institutional architecture and regulatory framework(s) is patently impossible in conventional 
terms; however, a case study evaluation of the role played by OBSF in the 2008 financial 
crisis, arguably the most serious in history, will demonstrate its failure to address what might 
have been expected to have been one of the most basic aims of the system, a large scale 
financial crisis contributed to by large scale corporate misinformation. It examines how the 
regulatory regime which largely comprised specific offences with limited deterrent value 
failed to adequately deter the manipulation of corporate information. Regrettably the 
criminalisation of generic behaviour in the Fraud Act 2006 did not come into force until 
January 15, 2007 and was therefore too late to have a significant impact, even though it was 
potentially highly suited to this role. Given that OBSF evolves in response to regulation and 
its form at any moment in time tends to be unknown until revealed by scandal, this article has 
not attempted any evaluation of the current state of play with regard to OBSF and the 
adequacy of the current regulatory regime to combat it. Overall, this article argues that 
improving the effectiveness of anti-fraud legislation could provide scope for significant cuts 
in the volume and complexity of company law, with substantial potential savings in corporate 
transaction costs.  
 
The contribution of off balance sheet finance to the 2008 financial crisis - a case study in 
the failure of the mandatory disclosure regime 
 
The problems created by the use of OBSF have been recognised in the UK since the 1980s,31 
though the practice can arguably be traced back to at least the 1920s in other forms.32 OBSF 
gained international prominence with the US Enron scandal which broke in 2001.33 Despite 
measures designed to combat such schemes, it will be shown how OBSF emerged once more 
as a significant feature in the financial crisis of 2007 onwards in both the UK and the US. 
Defining off balance sheet finance is a difficult task, first because successful schemes are 
unlikely to draw attention for reasons of commercial confidentiality, and secondly because 
each such scheme represents a response to a particular set of legal requirements, whether 
from regulation or from market mechanisms, such as ratio requirements imposed by ratings 
agencies or requirements set out in articles of association. The central problem of off balance 
sheet finance is, therefore, one of interpretation, redolent of Portia’s judgment in 
Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice:  
 
“This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood;  
The words expressly are, a pound of flesh:  
Take thee thy bond, take thou thy pound of flesh;  
                                                 
31 See, for example, M. Dickson, “Rescue from a Financial Minefield, Events which brought Burnett and 
Hallamshire group to edge of collapse”, Financial Times 24th January 1986 and  “Retailing giant Burton Group 
has raised £100 million off-balance sheet finance with the creation of a 50% property holding associate”, 
Accountancy Age 16th October 1986. 
32 “Off-balance sheet finance – why all the fuss”, Accountancy 26th June 1987, referring to a 1925 letter of Sir 
Arthur Whinney to the Times objecting to the consolidation of subsidiary companies into one balance sheet. 
Such schemes may not be limited to business enterprises, seemingly cathedrals may have indulged in it too, see 
A. Jack, “Thou Shalt Not Cook the Books”, Financial Times 17th December 1993. 
33 A. Hill and S. Fidler “Enron ties itself up in knots, then falls over” Financial Times, 29th January 2002. 
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But, in the cutting of it, if thou dost shed  
One drop of ... blood, thy lands and goods  
Are by the laws of Venice, confiscate ... .” 
 
Ernst & Young put it nicely, saying “The term implies that certain things belong on the 
balance sheet and that those which escape the net are deviations from this norm”.34 There are, 
however, a wide variety of schemes that can constitute OBSF, including the use of 
consignment stock, factoring, sale and repurchase, deferred consideration and the use of 
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) which carry with them different levels of risk.35 This article 
will focus on the use of SPVs as these have been most associated with the use of OBSF in the 
UK banking crisis.36  
 
The Greene Committee 1926 first raised the issue of what form the accounts of holding 
companies should take.37 It noted that there had been complaints from shareholders in 
holding companies that their accounts were unintelligible without fuller details of subsidiary 
and associated companies, and that some wanted a compulsory consolidated balance sheet for 
the whole group of companies.38 This was rejected on the basis that the matter should be left 
to shareholders to make such requirements, and that many holding companies had done so 
already: “we consider that undue interference by the legislature in the internal affairs of 
companies is to be avoided, even if some risk of hardship in individual cases is involved.”39 
Even at this early stage it was observed that there was a “considerable divergence of views ... 
among both commercial men and accountants”.40 It was felt, however, that shareholders and 
others were entitled to know whether proposed dividends were justified by group results and 
therefore it was necessary to include a definition of “holding company” and “subsidiary 
company” for this purpose.41 Two alternative tests were adopted, therefore, based on 
“control”: first, where the holding company held more than 50 per cent of voting power or 
the issued share capital in the subsidiary company, or, secondly, where the holding company 
had the power to appoint or nominate the majority of directors of the subsidiary.42.These 
were incorporated in the Companies Act 1929.43  
 
The Cohen Committee 1945 recommended both the thorough revision of the definition of 
holding and subsidiary company and the introduction of a requirement for a consolidated 
balance sheet and profit and loss account.44 Its reasons for concluding that the existing 
definitions were unsatisfactory were that: (1) it failed to include sub-subsidiary companies; 
(2) it included as subsidiaries companies which “may be neither under the holding company’s 
de facto control for management purposes as branches of the business of the holding 
company group nor subject to its legal power of control as regards matters as the appointment 
                                                 
34 UK GAAP p. 1233. 
35 I. Griffiths, New Creative Accounting (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 129 – 146. 
36 Whilst, SPEs were prominent in the US account of the financial crisis  
37 Greene Committee Report (2006), para. 71 . 
38 Ibid p. 33, para. 71. 
39 Ibid p. 34, para. 71. 
40 Ibid p. 33, para. 71. 
41 It was observed that there was nothing in law to prevent a holding company using a dividend from profit-
making subsidiaries to pay a dividend on its own shares without taking account of losses suffered by other 
subsidiaries, ibid see p. 34, para. 71. 
42Ibid p. 36 – 37, para VII. Where there was no actual control the directors could certify that “the holding 
company is not lawfully entitled or is otherwise unable to obtain the information” needed.  
43 Companies Act 1929, ss. 125 – 127. 
44 Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cohen Report 1945) pp. 69 - 76, paras 115 – 122. 
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of a majority of their directors”.45 In the Committee’s view, the decisive test should be the 
question of control, following evidence from the US and Canada, with the only exception 
being where a company owned more than half the equity share capital in another since it was 
felt that “such a concentrated holding may well give practical control of the business although 
the holding company does not necessarily possess a majority of the voting power”.46 Their 
recommendations were to form the basis of the long-standing provisions of the Companies 
Act 1948. Broadly, a company was regarded as the holding company of a subsidiary 
company where (1) it was a member of it and controlled the composition of its board of 
directors; (2) it held more than half in nominal value of its equity share capital; or (3) the 
subsidiary company was a sub-subsidiary company.47 In addition, there were a range of much 
tighter supporting provisions, for example, defining when the composition of a company’s 
board was deemed to be controlled by another, the significance of how a company’s shares 
were held, and defining the expressions “company” and “equity share capital”.48 These 
provisions were re-enacted in substantially the same terms in the Companies Act 1985,49 
surviving in force until major changes to the entire framework were introduced as from 
November 1, 1990.50 They were, however, easily manipulated, for example, by exploiting the 
definition of “equity share capital” and the use of weighted voting rights at board meetings.51  
 
It can be seen, therefore, that the rationale for recognising groups of companies for 
accounting purposes was controversial and overrode private provision for this being 
developed by shareholders. It was based on the perceived need for shareholders to know 
whether proposed dividends were justified by group results, and required the enactment of 
ever-more complex definitional provisions to support it. Ironically, these definitions provided 
the scope for off balance sheet finance because of their rigidity and exclusion of subjective 
judgment. Simultaneously, they increased expectations of what the balance sheet of a holding 
company meant.  
 
The increasingly high profile of OBSF schemes in the early 1980s provided much of the 
impetus for reform. Notable among these were what was described in the Financial Times as 
“the full horror story behind the collapse of Burnett and Hallamshire”,52 and the scale of use 
of a “diamond” arrangement by the Burton Group, involving the sale of £100 million of 
properties to Hall and Sons, a company which was outside of its group for certain tax 
purposes but inside it for others.53 The method used by the Burton Group is illuminating. 
Shares in Hall and Sons were owned equally between a 100 per cent subsidiary and a 50 per 
cent associate company of the Burton Group, with the Burton Group taking a minority of 
seats on the board to reflect its 50 per cent direct voting control through the 100 per cent 
subsidiary.54 However, the Burton Group had the option to reacquire the properties at cost 
whenever it chose through an arrangement with a bank that had provided £70 million non-
                                                 
45 Ibid p. 70, para. 118. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Companies Act 1948, s. 154(1).  
48 Companies Act 1948, ss. 154(2) to (5).  
49 Companies Act 1985, s736; the updating consisted mainly of clearer language and the addition of a definition 
of “wholly-owned subsidiary”. 
50 Subject to transitional provisions, see Companies Act 1989, s. 144(1).   
51 Tolley’s Company Law, Section H “Holding and Subsidiary Companies” (Issue 4, March 1991), para. H5007.  
52 Dickson (n 31). 
53 Accountancy Age April 16th, 1987, “Substance over form is a mighty fine sounding principle – accountancy’s 
version of motherhood and apple pie”. 
54 Ibid. 
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recourse funding to Hall and Sons.55 Ironically, it has been suggested that the DTI’s role in 
the prosecutions in the Argyll Foods case inhibited the proper accounting treatment of certain 
off-balance sheet schemes because of its statement after the magistrates’ finding against the 
defendants, preferring law over substance.56 In this case, the audit report for Argyll Foods 
Ltd included a note expressing the opinion that the consolidation of Morgan Edwards Ltd and 
Subsidiaries, which at the relevant date was not legally a subsidiary (but was the subject of 
merger negotiations between companies managed and effectively controlled by the same 
people), did not comply with ss. 150 and 154 Companies Act 1948 (Group accounts and 
definition of subsidiary) and with SSAP 14 (effective date of acquisition of subsidiary).57 
However, the note proceeded to state that the accounts were not rendered “misleading” 
because of the non-compliance and gave a true and fair view.58 Several directors were issued 
with summonses alleging that the accounts did not show a true and fair view but not with 
breaching the specific provisions of the companies’ legislation referred to.59 The case was 
tried in the magistrates’ court, involved a galaxy of impressive witnesses, including the head 
of the Government Accounting Service (a former ICAEW president), and resulted in the 
relevant directors being conditionally discharged.60   
 
The accountancy profession took some initiative in seeking to address OBSF itself, with the 
ICAEW issuing TR603 in December 1985 as interim guidance only, but with the support of 
the DTI.61 “Off balance sheet finance” was defined as “The funding or refinancing of a 
company’s operations in such a way that, under legal requirements and existing accounting 
conventions, some or all of the finance may not be shown on its balance sheet”.62 The 
importance of non-subsidiary dependent companies was emphasised by their use in Appendix 
A as an illustration of off balance sheet finance. The Technical Release distinguished 
between accounting and disclosure based approaches, where accounting solutions were 
recorded in the financial statements themselves as opposed to the making of additional 
disclosures.63 It noted that the principle was recognised in the legal requirement for accounts 
to show a true and fair view that there were circumstances where no amount of additional 
disclosure could take the place of appropriate accounting.64 Furthermore, where inappropriate 
accounting could mislead, accounting, rather than disclosure, solutions should be adopted, 
though such accounting solutions should “usually” comply with the specific requirements of 
the law rather than rely on the true and fair override.65 The provisional advice was that the 
accounting treatment of transactions should be based on economic substance rather than legal 
form, and any difference disclosed in the notes to the accounts, but that where – rarely – this 
would not comply with the law and the transaction was material, a true and fair view should 
be provided by presenting separate pro-forma accounts based on economic substance.66 A 
                                                 
55 Ibid.  
56 A legally unreported Magistrates’ Court trial which was reported by R.K. Ashton, “The Argyll Foods Case, A 
Legal Analysis”, (1986) 17(65) Accounting and Business Research, pp. 3-12 for the benefit of future researchers 
in this area. 
57 Ibid pp. 3 and 11. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid, p. 3. 
60 Ibid., p. 7.  
61 TR603 (December 1985); see Accountancy February 1986. It was expressly noted (para. 2) that the DTI 
rejected any suggestion that the approach being taken by the ICAEW was inconsistent with the DTI’s statement 
in relation to the Argyll Foods case. See further para. 14 for a further discussion of the DTI’s statement.  
62 Para. 5(i). 
63 Para. 8.  
64 Para. 9 
65 Paras 9 and 10. 
66 Para. 17.  
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series of exposure drafts followed,67 leading to the issue of FRS 5 in April 1994, which 
remains in force.68 Meanwhile the property slump of the late 1980s and the recession of the 
early 1990s highlighted the role played by OBSF in a number of companies that found 
themselves in difficulties, with off balance sheet subsidiaries unable to repay their debts and 
parent companies finding that they could not avoid responsibility for loans assumed to be 
non-recourse.69 
 
The ability of the accountancy profession to address the problem of controlled non-
subsidiaries was limited, given the DTI accepted the lawyers’ viewpoint that their 
consolidation in accounts would be illegal.70 The EC Seventh Directive on Consolidated 
Accounts provided a golden opportunity to address the problem, and it seems that an ASC 
working party suggested to the DTI that it could use its implementation in legislation to 
require consolidation.71 The DTI accepted that the use of controlled non-subsidiaries as a 
means of off balance sheet finance could not be solved by the use of the true and fair 
override, and recognised that the EC definition would introduce a “measure of judgment” into 
what was considered to be a subsidiary or not, something that would be an appropriate area 
for accounting standards even if ultimately a matter for the courts to determine.72 The 
approach taken to implementation in the Companies Act 1989 was innovative, and 
represented a sea-change from earlier approaches. The general tests of “holding company” 
and “subsidiary company”, which by now were used for a wide range of legal purposes, often 
unrelated to company law, were separated from the new tests of “parent undertaking” and 
“subsidiary undertaking”, which would be used mainly for legal purposes related to 
accounting.73 A power to amend the definitions of “holding company”, “subsidiary” and 
“wholly owned subsidiary” by statutory instrument was also included.74  The general tests 
were tightened up as part of the exercise to give better effect to the underlying concept of 
control and presumably to avoid the manipulation of what constituted equity share capital and 
the use of weighted voting rights on the board. Accordingly, the test based on holding more 
than half in nominal value of another company’s equity share capital was replaced with 
holding “a majority of the voting rights” in that other company.75 Furthermore, the test based 
on membership and controlling the composition of another company’s board of directors was 
replaced with a test based on membership and “the right to appoint or remove a majority of 
                                                 
67 ED 42 (March 1988); ED 49 (May 1990) and FRED 4 (March 1993). ED42 notably defined a “controlled 
non-subsidiary” as “a company, trust or other vehicle which, though not fulfilling the Companies Act definition 
of a subsidiary, is directly or indirectly controlled by, and a source of benefits or risks for, the reporting 
enterprise that are in substance no different from those that would arise were the vehicle a subsidiary”, see 
Accountancy (April 1988). 
68 As amended by “’Reporting the Substance of Transactions’: Revenue Recognition” (November 2003), 
“’Reporting the Substance of Transactions’: Private Finance Initiative and Similar Contracts” (September 1998), 
“’Reporting the Substance of Transactions’: Insurance Broking Transactions and Financial Reinsurance” (1994) 
and FRS 25 and FRS 26. Discussed further below. 
69 Financial Times, December, 11 1992 “Property – Creative collapse”. 
70 C.K.M. Pong, “Jurisdictional contests between accountants and lawyers: the case of off-balance sheet finance 
1985 – 1990” (1990) 4(1) Accounting History 7, 22. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid. 
73 Companies Act 1985, s. 736 and s. 736A (as substituted by Companies Act 1989, s. 144(1)) (definitions of 
holding company, subsidiary and wholly owned subsidiary and supplemental provisions) and Companies Act 
1985, ss. 258 to 260   (as substituted by Companies Act 1989, s. 22) (definitions of parent and subsidiary 
undertakings, undertaking and related expressions and participating interests).  
74 Companies Act 1985, s. 736B (as inserted by Companies Act 1989, s. 144(3)).  
75 Companies Act 1985, s. 736(1)(a) (as substituted by Companies Act 1989, s. 144(1)).  See also Companies 
Act 1985, s. 736A (2)  (as substituted) which further defined voting rights to extend to “rights conferred on 
shareholders ... to vote at general meetings of the company on all, or substantially all, matters”. 
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its board of directors”.76 An additional test based on membership and control of a majority of 
voting rights pursuant to an agreement with other members was introduced following the EC 
Seventh Directive.77 For accounting purposes, three additional approaches were adopted. The 
first was to extend the tests based on membership of another company, for example, so that 
an undertaking would be deemed to be a member of an undertaking where a subsidiary 
undertaking was a member of an another undertaking.78 The second was where a parent 
undertaking had the right to exercise a “dominant influence” over another undertaking 
through its memorandum or articles of association or a control contract.79 The third was 
where a parent undertaking had a “participating interest” in another undertaking and 
“actually” exercised a dominant influence over it, or it and the subsidiary undertaking were 
“managed on a unified basis”;80 a holding of 20 per cent or more of the shares in an 
undertaking was deemed to be a participating interest unless the contrary was shown,81 but 
the meaning of “dominant influence” was left undefined.  
 
Despite the apparent comprehensiveness of the new definitions introduced by the Companies 
Act 1989, flaws became rapidly apparent.82 The general test might be avoided, it was 
suggested, by two parties, for example, establishing a company for a specific purpose to 
which it could be bound by a commercial contract to one party, deadlocked at general 
meeting and board level but with the desired percentage of the economic interest in the 
company held by that one party.83 Similarly, it was suggested that off balance sheet vehicles 
might be constructed for accounting purposes by using “orphan” vehicles and “joint venture” 
vehicles; in the first no shareholding interest would be taken, in the second control might be 
deadlocked.84 Pimm reviewed a range of possible schemes that could remain off balance 
sheet.85 He distinguished two possible approaches: the “entity” approach under which 
consolidated accounts should include all assets controlled by the parent, and the “ownership” 
approach where such accounts only included those assets from which the parent’s 
shareholders benefited and questioned whether the Government was right to opt for control as 
the “only” criterion for defining subsidiary undertakings, because if so such schemes as he 
identified were perfectly proper.86  In his view, if there was surprise that some schemes 
remained off balance sheet, it was probably because a different concept of the group was 
envisaged; if the Government had chosen the wrong criterion further work would be needed 
by it or the ASB87.  
 
                                                 
76 Companies Act 1985, s. 736(1)(b) (as substituted by Companies Act 1989, s. 144(1)). On the face of it, this 
seems little different to the previous test, however, its meaning is supplemented by Companies Act 1985, s. 
736A (as substituted) which states that the right means “the right to appoint or remove directors holding a 
majority of the voting rights at meetings of the board on all, or substantially all, matters” with further 
explanation of the meaning of a power of appointment or removal.  
77 Companies Act 1985, s. 736(1)(c) (as substituted by Companies Act 1989, s. 144(1)).  
78 Companies Act 1985, s. 258(3) (as inserted by Companies Act 1989, s. 21(1)). 
79 Companies Act 1985, s. 258(2)(c)  (as inserted by Companies Act 1989, s. 21(1)). 
80 Companies Act 1985, s. 258(4) (as inserted by Companies Act 1989, s. 21(1)). [See 82 below] 
81 Companies Act 1985, s. 260(2) (as inserted by Companies Act 1989, s. 22). 
82 See, for example, the amendment to Companies Act 1985, s. 258(4) by Companies Act 1985 (International 
Accounting Standards and Other Accounting Amendments) Regs 2004, SI 2004/2947 reg 12(1).. 
83 Tolley’s (n 51) para H5015.  
84 Ibid, para. H5021. 
85 D. Pimm, “Off balance sheet vehicles survive redefinition” Accountancy (June 1990), pp.88 – 91. The 
structures he identified were: (1) the use of unequal voting rights; (2) the “diamond” structure; (3) management 
contracts; (4) the use of charitable trusts, and (4) the use of share options and conversion rights. 
86 Ibid., pp. 88 and 91. 
87 Ibid. 
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FRS 5, “Reporting the Substance of Transactions”, was introduced in 1994.88 Its basic aim 
was to “determine the substance of a transaction ... whether any resulting assets or liabilities 
should be included in the balance sheet, and what disclosures are appropriate”.89 So, when 
any particular transaction falls to be analysed, the question was “to identify whether it has 
given rise to new assets or liabilities for the entity and whether it has increased or decreased 
the entity’s existing assets or liabilities”.90 The term “quasi-subsidiary” was coined for a 
vehicle controlled by a company preparing accounts that did not meet the legal definition of a 
subsidiary but where the commercial effect of placing assets and liabilities in it was no 
different from a subsidiary.91 In these circumstances, FRS 5 required the assets, liabilities etc. 
and any quasi-subsidiary to be included in the consolidated financial statements of the 
controlling group as if it were a subsidiary and also for  the disclosure in summary form of 
the quasi-subsidiaries’ financial statements. 92  
 
The next round of changes was unleashed by the Enron scandal, notorious for the role played 
by OBSF, this time originating in flaws in US regulation, which allowed entities to be treated 
as off balance sheet where at least 3 per cent of the capital was owned by company 
outsiders.93 The regulatory consequences, including the controversial and far-reaching 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, relate therefore to US law and fall outside the scope of this article. 
Nonetheless, the Enron scandal led to much soul-searching outside the US because of 
Enron’s global reach, and did result in some significant changes. In the UK, it contributed to 
the Companies Act 2004, which, for example, strengthened the regulatory regime in relation 
to the enforcement and monitoring of accounting and audit standards by the creation of the 
Professional Oversight Board for Accountancy (POBA).94  In the EC a Regulation was 
adopted requiring listed companies to prepare their consolidated accounts in accordance with 
International Accounting Standards (IAS), now known as International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS).95 This seemingly technical move was in fact revolutionary for UK law and 
practice, in terms of the extent of UK control over how off balance sheet finance is 
regulated.96 The EC Regulation required companies with securities traded on a regulated 
market to use IAS for their consolidated accounts but allowed Member States to permit or 
require their use by other companies as well.97 This choice was reflected in UK legislation, 
but with a “ratchet” provision so that once IAS accounts have been prepared by a company, 
                                                 
88 It was effective for financial statements relating to accounting periods ending on or after September 22, 1994, 
with earlier adoption encouraged but not required, see FRS 5 “Reporting the Substance of Transactions (1994), 
para. 39.  
89 FRS 5, p. 4. 
90 Ibid., p. 5.  
91 FRS 5, p. 7. 
92 However, controversially, where a quasi-subsidiary was used to finance a specific item subject to specific 
non-recourse finance arrangements, controversially a “linked presentation” is required showing on the face of 
the balance sheet the finance deducted from the gross amount of the item financed. This was only required 
where the item was financed in a way that the maximum loss that could be suffered as limited to a fixed 
monetary amount. See FRS 5, pp. 6 – 7. 
93 A. Hill and S. Fidler “Enron ties itself up in knots, then falls over” Financial Times, January 29, 2002. 
94 See http://www.frc.org.uk/About-the-FRC/FRC-structure/Former-FRC-structure/Professional-Oversight-
Board.aspx. [Accessed January 28, 2015]. 
95 Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 on the application of international accounting standards (July 19, 2002), 
effective from January 1, 2005. 
96 See P.L. Davies and S. Worthington, Gower & Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2012) pp. 770 – 771 for a brief consideration of the governance implications of this, such as the 
creation of a Monitoring Board, and the filtering process put in place, to give the European Commission some 
very limited residual influence.  
97 Reg. 1606/2002 art. 5. 
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all subsequent accounts must be as well, subject to specific exceptions.98 Henceforth, 
however, UK company law continued to police compliance of accounts with the relevant 
regulatory requirements99 but with progressively little influence over their content. 
 
The immediate effects of the introduction of IAS were, however, relatively modest. The 
consolidation of financial statements had been addressed by IAS 3 since as long ago as 1976. 
There was an interactive relationship between the development of the relevant IASs and EC 
Directives, with IAS 3 being referred to in discussions on the Seventh Directive and its 
successor in 1990, IAS 27, reflecting further improvements that had been made in developing 
the Seventh Directive.100 Significantly, it followed the Seventh Directive’s notion of control, 
with the core definition of a “subsidiary” being an entity that was controlled by the parent. 
Control was seen as the power to govern the financial and operating policies of an entity so as 
to obtain benefits from its activities, and was generally presumed to exist where the parent 
owned directly or indirectly more than half of the voting power of an entity.101 But control 
could also exist where the parent owned half or less of the voting power of an entity, for 
example, where the parent had power to appoint or remove the majority of the members of 
the board of directors or equivalent. SIC 12 specifically addressed special purpose entities, 
providing that when the substance of the relationship indicated that the parent entity 
controlled the other, for example, where it pre-determined the special purpose entity’s 
activities, then the special purpose entity should be consolidated.102 IAS 27 was subsequently 
reissued in 2008,103 the year of the financial crash.  
 
The Company Law Review Steering Group in its consultation document Developing the 
Framework identified the “problems with the current structure and legal framework” for 
accounting and reporting; perhaps surprisingly, off balance sheet finance, which goes to the 
heart of the reliability of the framework, was not identified.104 The only suggestion that the 
information might be defective concerned the backward looking nature of financial reporting 
and its reliance on financial indicators, as opposed for example to more qualitative factors.105 
However, the subsequent consultation document, Completing the Structure, was more 
pertinent. It questioned which of the rules governing consolidated accounts should be in 
statute as opposed to delegated rules, including the question of whether a company had 
subsidiary undertakings and was therefore a parent company.106 It also rejected subjecting all 
accounting standards rules to criminal sanctions, arguing that this would tend towards “the 
legalistic approach that everyone wishes to avoid”; however, it did support the creation of a 
new criminal offence of publishing accounts calculated to deceive or mislead because this 
would apply specifically to the preparation and publication of annual accounts with dishonest 
                                                 
98 Companies Act 2006 ss. 395(1) and 395 (3) – 5).  
99 Companies Act 2006 s. 414 (4), criminalises non-compliance with the Act and where applicable Art. 4 of the 
Regulation.  
100 D. Cairns, Applying International Accounting Standards (Tolley, 2002), p. 236. Further guidance on IAS 27 
was provided by SIC 12 and SIC33. 
101 The exception being where in exceptional circumstances it can be clearly demonstrated that such ownership 
does not constitute control.  
102 Cairns, (n 100) p. 241. See now IFRS 10 “Consolidated Financial Statements”, IFRS 11 “Joint 
Arrangements” and IFRS 12 “Disclosure of Interests In Other Entities”. These were effective from January 1, 
2013 and therefore fall outside the scope of this article. 
103And further amended with effect from January 1, 2009 and July 1, 2010. 
104 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy, Developing the 
Framework (Department of Trade and Industry, March 2000), pp. 157 – 158. 
105 Ibid., p. 158 
106 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy, Completing the 
Framework (Department of Trade and Industry, November 2000), pp. 130 – 1. 
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intent.107 The White Paper “Modernising Company Law” did not make much of OBSF; 
however, given the relevant section commenced by observing that from January 1, 2005 all 
listed British companies would follow IAS and that the EC Commission would be updating 
the Directives on company and group accounts, this was perhaps unsurprising.108  
 
The only material change relevant to the problem of off balance sheet finance to be set out in 
the Companies Act 2006 was in fact to be derived from EC law.109 Section 410A110 now 
requires disclosure in the annual accounts where a company is or has been party to 
“arrangements not reflected in its balance sheet” and “the risks or benefits arising from those 
arrangements are material”, specifically of the nature and business purpose of the 
arrangements and the financial impact of the arrangements on the company.111 The disclosure 
required is limited to the extent that is necessary to enable the financial position of the 
company to be assessed.112 Small companies do not have to comply, and there is a minor 
exemption for medium-sized companies.113 The provision stirred up some small controversy 
within the accounting profession, and the FRC’s ASB issued a statement114 that its Urgent 
Issues Task Force had been addressing the legal definition of off balance sheet finance 
arrangements. The DBERR’s guidance was noted which took the view that:115 
 
“... Such off balance-sheet arrangements may be associated with the creation or use of one or 
more Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) and offshore activities designed to address, inter alia, 
economic, legal, tax or accounting objectives ...” 
 
It observed that neither the Directive nor the Companies Act provided one, and that it could 
not issue an abstract without a definition in place.  
 
A very great number of reasons have been advanced for the 2008 financial crisis and it is 
impossible to say which made a greater or lesser or a sine qua non contribution. Nonetheless, 
some influential voices have argued that off balance sheet finance played a material role. 
 
The ACCA Policy Paper “Climbing out of the Credit Crunch” questioned whether accounting 
standards had “inadvertently made the credit crunch worse by turning a crisis of liquidity into 
one of solvency” but mainly focused on the implications of mark to market accounting.116 
Cryptically, it noted that: 
 
                                                 
107 Ibid., pp. 128 – 9.  
108 White Paper “Modernising Company Law” (July 2002), Cm 5553-I,  p. 33. 
109 Directive 2006/46/EC amending Directives 78/660/EC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC. The 
definitions of “subsidiary”, “holding company” and “wholly owned subsidiary” set out in Companies Act 1985 
ss. 736 and 736A (as amended) were substantially re-enacted in Companies Act 2006 s. 1159 and Sch. 6; the 
definitions of “parent undertaking” and “subsidiary undertaking” set out in ss. 258 – 259 and Sch. 10A 
Companies Act 1985 (as amended) were substantially re-enacted in ss. 1161 – 1162 and Sch. 7 Companies Act 
2006 ss. 1161 – 1162 and Sch. 7. 
110 Inserted by the Companies Act 2006 (Amendment) (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/393, 
reg. 8 as from April 6, 2008, see specifically recitals (8) and (9) and Article 1 (6). 
111 Companies Act 2006 s. 410A(1) and (2). 
112 Companies Act 2006 s. 410A(3). 
113 Companies Act 2006 s. 410A(1) and (4). 
114 ASB PN328. 
115 DBERR “Guidance for UK companies on Accounting and Reporting: Requirements under the Companies 
Act 2006 and the application of the IAS regulation”, (June 2008). 
116 ACCA Policy Paper “Climbing out of the Credit Crunch” (September 2008), p. 5. 
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“The credit crunch is not another Enron as far as the accountancy profession is concerned – 
though in the extensive use of off-balance sheet vehicles there is a superficial resemblance – 
but preparers and auditors of accounts in the affected organisations legitimately face 
questions.”117 
 
The ACCA Discussion Paper “Corporate Governance and the Credit Crunch” noted that: 
 
“Inconsistencies in capital regulations encouraged banks to use off-balance sheet 
arrangements for holding assets, in order to lower regulatory capital. The credit crunch 
exposed the fact that off-balance sheet vehicles were still liabilities of the institutions, 
because of reputational risk or liquidity recourse agreements.”118  
 
It went on to ask whether “the present close linkage between accounting numbers and 
regulatory capital requirements [should] be broken”.119 
 
Tomasic interestingly observed the extensive use of off balance sheet entities, but criticised 
instead the structured investment vehicles (SIVs) because they “failed to adequately isolate a 
company from the liabilities that had been placed in these entities”.120 Specifically, he 
criticised the use of a SPV, Granite, by Northern Rock because (1) it formed part of the 
flawed “originate and distribute” business model, where originators of loans did not have 
incentives to assess and monitor credit risks and investors in the SPV were less able to; (2) 
such entities resulted in ambiguity and confusion regarding the risks associated with the 
offbalance sheet vehicle.121 
 
The Turner Review identified two forms of off balance sheet vehicles as contributing to 
increased system vulnerability, “structured investment vehicles” (SIVs) and “conduits”, 122 
seen as examples of “shadow banking”123 and later described as “one of the crucial factors in 
the origins of the crisis”.124 Such shadow banks were “performing bank-like functions, but ... 
were not regulated as banks”.125 SIVs were singled out as a clear case of regulatory 
arbitrage,126 though it was acknowledged that many of the problems arose from inadequate 
regulation in major centres such as London and New York and that the role of offshore 
financial centres was “not central”.127 These were not included in standard measures of gross 
or risk adjusted leverage, despite being highly leveraged, and their classification as off-
balance sheet turned out to be inaccurate because many banks were in effect forced to take 
these back on balance sheet because of liquidity provision commitments and reputational 
concerns.128 The Turner Review also criticised such vehicles as a form of “shadow banking” 
because they were performing “large-scale maturity transformation between short-term 
                                                 
117 Ibid. 
118 ACCA Discussion Paper “Corporate Governance and the Credit Crunch” (November 2008), p. 12. 
119 Ibid. 
120 R. Tomasic, “Corporate rescue, governance and risk-taking in Northern Rock: Part 1” (2008) 29(10) The 
Company Lawyer 297 at 303. 
121 Ibid. at 331. 
122 FSA, “A regulatory response to the global banking crisis” (Financial Services Authority, March 2009), p.20 
(Turner Review). 
123 Ibid., p. 21, the others listed after it being investment banks and mutual funds that had extended their 
activities into bank-like maturity transformation, discussed below. 
124 Ibid., p. 70. 
125 Ibid.  
126 Ibid., p. 71. 
127 Ibid., p. 74. 
128 Ibid. 
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promises to note-holders and much longer term instruments held on the asset side”.129 This 
rather opaque terminology is explained as referring to the usual banking practice of holding 
longer term assets than liabilities, a crucial function but carrying the risk that if everyone 
wanted their money back on the contractual date, no bank could repay them all.130 A more 
specific problem arising from the use of SIVs was that senior notes were given high credit 
ratings on the basis that the SIV would be wound up before the holders were at risk, but led to 
a systemic problem because there were attempted simultaneous asset sales by multiple SIVs 
leading to a rapid disappearance of liquidity.131 
 
The Turner Review concluded:132 
 
“The essential principle which needs therefore to be agreed and implemented internationally 
is that regulation should focus on economic substance not legal form. Off-balance sheet 
vehicles which create substantive economic risk ... must be treated as if on-balance sheet for 
regulatory purposes.” 
 
The HM Treasury White Paper “Reforming Financial Markets” observed: 
 
“[R]egulators and central banks, and many other authorities and commentators 
underestimated the risks that were building up in the financial system. They did not 
appreciate the true extent of system-wide risks or the full implications of activities outside the 
regulatory boundary, in particular the build-up by banks of large exposures to off-balance 
sheet financing vehicles, and the lack of transparency that accompanied them.”133 
 
The Future of Banking Commission Report134 also thought that accounting standards needed 
to be reviewed; one of many examples given was international inconsistency between UK 
banks applying IFRS and US banks applying US GAAP in the rules surrounding off balance 
sheet vehicles and Repo transactions. In its view: “The accounting standards should not allow 
assets and liabilities to move off the balance sheet without trace. Such off-balance sheet 
transactions result in banks carrying more leverage than investors, clients, trading counterparties 
and central banks realise.”135 
 
Concerns about the role of off balance sheet finance loomed large in the US as well, with the 
Valukas Report and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, albeit of a different nature to the 
manipulation of group company relationships that this article focuses on. Lehman had used 
“Repo 105” transactions to temporarily remove $49.102 billion and $50.383 billion from its 
balance sheets at the first and second 2008 quarter year ends, succeeding by doing so in 
reducing its net leverage by 1.9 per cent and 1.8 per cent respectively.136 Repo 105 was in 
essence “a trick allowing Lehman to sell packages of mortgages, Treasury bonds, Eurobonds, 
even Canadian government instruments, on a temporary basis at the end of an accounting 
                                                 
129 Ibid., p. 21. 
130 Ibid. But the Review later notes that these vehicles had “liabilities far shorter in tenor than the maturity of 
assets”, p. 70. 
131 Ibid., p. 22. 
132 Ibid., p. 72. Its recommendations included the bullet-point under “Institutional and geographical coverage” 
“Economic substance, not legal form”.  
133 HM Treasury White Paper “Reforming Financial Markets” (HM Treasury, Cm 7667, July 2009), p. 4. 
134 The Future of Banking Commission Report (2010) pp. 70 and 73. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Valukas Report (March 2011), pp. 18 – 20. 
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quarter, with an obligation to buy them back a few weeks later”.137 Subsequently, there have 
been suggestions that the massaging of Lehman’s balance sheet was not unusual. One 
technique that emerged from an internal review at Freddie Mac found that it had entered into 
a series of deals with Credit Suisse that allowed the investment banks trading desk to ‘park’ 
some $8 billion in mortgage-backed securities on the mortgage firm’s balance sheet.138 
Another technique used elsewhere was for a bank to borrow money at the beginning of a 
quarter, invest it in short-term bonds that mature before the end of the quarter, then pay back 
its debts, so that the bank appeared to generate more profit off what appeared to be fewer 
assets.139 The US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission observed how the growth of a shadow 
banking system that rivalled the size of the traditional banking system had been allowed to 
grow, with key components including the use of off balance sheet entities being “hidden from 
view”, without the protections constructed to prevent financial meltdowns.140 Within the EU 
too, the De Larosiere Report highlighted the role played in the crisis by off balance sheet 
special purpose vehicles in generating a dramatic expansion of leverage within the financial 
system.141 
 
The overall conclusion is that the role of OBSF in the 2008 financial crisis and the severe 
impact on the Western world for generations to come show not only the failure of technical 
regulatory approaches to OBSF but a fundamental need for deterrence, something that the 
criminal law is ideally placed to achieve.  
 
The economic case for a strong anti-fraud rule over mandatory disclosure 
 
This need for deterrence is supported by economic analysis. Becker, in a ground-breaking 
study, has argued that criminal sanctions have a price-like character, can be characterised in 
market terms and that optimal policies to combat illegal behaviour are part of an optimal 
allocation of resources. 142 Generally, he argues that fines are a preferable form of sanction 
because: (1) probation and institutionalisation use up social resources whereas fines are a 
transfer payment; (2) determination of the optimal number of offences and severity of 
punishments is somewhat simplified by the use of fines; (3) fines compensate victims in a 
way that other punishments do not.143 Nonetheless, he acknowledges that use of fines can be 
criticised on the basis of non-efficiency grounds, such as: (1) offences should not be capable 
of purchase as other commodities, which he rebuts on the basis that this simply substitutes a 
different unit of measurement; (2) punishment should not depend on the economic position of 
an offender, which he rebuts on the basis that, if the goal is to minimise social loss, then fines 
should depend on the harm done.144 Becker does, however, accept that in the case of certain 
crimes no money can compensate for the harm inflicted and fines cannot be relied upon 
where the harm exceeds the resources of an offender.145 This would appear to be the case 
                                                 
137 A. Clark, “Lehman Brothers: repo 105 and other accounting tricks” The Guardian, March 12, 2010. 
138 D. Wilchins and M. Goldstein, “Lehman balance sheet massaging may not be unusual” Guardian, March 13, 
2010.  
139 Ibid.  
140 US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report (January 2011), p. xx.  
141 The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU Report (the “De Larosiere Report”) (February 
2009), pp. 7 – 8. 
142 G.S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment – An Economic Approach” in The Economic Approach to Human 
Behaviour (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1976 reprinted from (1968) 76 Journal of 
Political Economy 169), p. 39 and especially at 49 and 77. 
143 Ibid., pp. 63 – 64. 
144 Ibid., pp. 64 – 65. 
145 Ibid., p. 66. 
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with the damage that can result from OBSF, for example, and suggests that both 
criminalisation and a realistic prospect of imprisonment as a consequence would be the 
appropriate approach to deterrence.  
 
Easterbrook and Fischel have explored the benefits of an anti-fraud rule: an anti-fraud rule 
could be cheaper than alternative certification methods or individual verification, 
notwithstanding problems of enforcement costs;146 however, such an anti-fraud measure 
could provoke the response by a company of remaining silent.147 Voluntary disclosure should 
take place in any event as companies offering disclosure would save investors’ search costs 
and therefore place themselves at a comparative advantage.148 Cheffins, in considering the 
appropriateness of mandatory requirements for small companies, questioned whether there 
was evidence of market failure justifying regulation, for example, systematic lapses of 
judgment among those running such businesses, but concluded that such evidence was 
meagre.149 Easterbrook and Fischel observe that: first, a mandatory disclosure obligation 
avoids the excessive production of redundant information, that is, it avoids duplication by a 
number of parties; secondly, it avoids the third-party effect of requiring companies to produce 
information which may be beneficial to unconnected parties who cannot be forced to pay for 
it; and thirdly, it enables standardisation of disclosure which no individual company would 
have the incentive to achieve.150 Coffee disagreed sharply with their analysis, preferring 
instead “a simpler theory” of society, through mandatory disclosure, subsidising the 
production of information otherwise under-produced; avoiding the waste that might arise 
otherwise through investors seeking trading gains; avoiding agency problems; and providing 
information needed by investors to optimise their portfolio.151 Easterbrook and Fischel may 
appear rather optimistic about the scope for the costs of fraud enforcement being less than 
alternative certification – though perhaps in aggregate this is correct. In conclusion, it would 
appear that the case for mandatory disclosure is not fully made out: the strongest arguments 
in favour of it would appear to be agency theory combined with standardisation, since 
management voluntarism might work well when a company is prospering but be subject to 
opportunism otherwise, and an absence of standardisation might render even strong anti-fraud 
measures ineffective.  
 
Mandatory disclosure does not necessarily suggest that mandatory auditing should follow. It 
has already been seen that Easterbrook and Fischel explored how an anti-fraud rule might be 
an alternative to mandatory disclosure and potentially preferable to alternative certification 
devices such as the audit. However, if the true rationale for mandatory audit is agency theory, 
then a mandatory audit would seem to be implied as well: Jensen and Meckling, for example, 
regarded audit costs as a typical “bonding” cost incurred as a consequence of the agency 
relationship.152 Bromwich draws attention to a number of conceptual problems with 
                                                 
146 F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, “Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors” (1984) 70 
Virginia Law Review 669 at 677-679, eg. Where prosecutions were concentrated on verifiable statements of fact 
rather than predictions. 
147 Ibid., at 677 and 680. 
148 Ibid., at 684-685. 
149 Cheffins, (n 2) p. 520. 
150 Easterbrook and Fischel, “Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors” (1984) 70 Virginia Law 
Review at 681-687. 
151 J.C. Coffee, “Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System” (1984) 70 Virginia 
Law Review 717, at 720-723, 737-747. See also I. MacNeil, “Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the 
Perspective of Incomplete Contract Theory” (2001) 1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 107 at 126, who argues 
that mandatory disclosure is necessary for the development of a securities’ market. 
152 Jensen and Meckling, op. cit., p. 9. 
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mandatory auditing, including the extent to which the principal controls the optimal 
information system and auditing requirements, the means by which the auditor might be 
motivated to be efficient in the same way as the manager and the possibility of collusion 
between the auditor and manager.153 Whilst collusion might be dealt with by an anti-fraud 
rule which is already assumed, the possibility of an auditor agency problem is more difficult 
and the solution probably lies in reputation: a poor auditor will be more associated with 
companies which fail and the market will value more highly a company audited by an auditor 
with a strong reputation. 
 
 
The failure of criminal sanctions in the banking crisis 
 
There have been serious concerns expressed regarding the failure of the criminal law to 
provide effective sanctions against the forms of conduct that emerged in the banking crisis, 
and, in particular, at the seeming dearth of prosecutions in the UK.154 What can be seen to 
have emerged by the time of the banking crisis, was a criminal law landscape comprising a 
number of general criminal provisions which might potentially have applied to accounts 
manipulation: for example, under the Theft Acts and a raft of highly ‘particularized’ criminal 
and regulatory provisions relating to the offences contained in the Companies Act 2006 and 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Significant overlaps in the wording of these 
offences mean that potentially the same conduct might in principle be prosecuted under a 
range of different provisions, subject to different conditions as to the intent required and the 
range of potential victims required to be shown. The position is further complicated by the 
fact that the banking crisis straddled a period of intense law reform of both criminal law and 
company law, so that potential offences might be committed under both old and new law. A 
range of approaches to analysis was therefore possible. This section will commence by 
analysing the requirement for dishonesty, which is a requirement for some – but not all – of 
the relevant offences, before analysing four categories of offence that OBSF potentially gives 
rise to: accounts related offences, share market related offences, offences in relation to the 
winding up of a company and general offences involving deception or fraud.  
 
Dishonesty 
 
The broad reach of the criminal law of fraud might come as a surprise to directors and 
company/ commercial practitioners more used to the regulatory and civil law regimes.  
Indeed, it may be suggested that important and widely publicised developments in the civil 
law have served as a distraction, focusing attention away from the criminal law.  The early 
run of civil cases that consider liability for misleading statements155 culminate in one of the 
most infamous cases to grace the law books today, Caparo v Dickman.156  Of note, the 
arguments rehearsed in the Court of Appeal were premised in the law of negligence. 
However, the original action was commenced in 1985 and claimed against the directors of the 
                                                 
153 Bromwich, op. cit., pp. 348 – 351. 
154 See, for example, A. Tyrie MP, Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (January 
2013, cited in J. Fisher “The global financial crisis: the case for a stronger criminal response” Law and Financial 
Markets Review (May 2013), Law and Financial Markets Review 159; and  J. Taylor, “Why have no bankers 
gone to jail?” History & Policy (October 2013).  
155 See for example London and General Bank (No 2) [1895] 2 Ch 673, CA and Newton v BSA [1906] 2 Ch. 
378. 
156 Caparo Industries v. Dickman [1989] QB 653 and House of Lords judgment at [1990] 2 AC 605. 
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company, Fidelity Plc, on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentation in contract law157 and 
against the auditors for negligent mis-statement of the company’s financial standing.  The 
directors did not appeal and therefore the focus of this landmark case was solely the auditor’s 
negligence point.  Whilst culpability in criminal law is not limited by Lord Atkinson’s 
“neighbour principle”, the civil law of negligence clearly is. As such, the essence of the 
auditor’s appeal was that while he was found to owe investors a duty of care as individuals, 
potential investors were a indeterminate class such that the relationship between them and the 
auditors was not so close and proximate as to give rise to a duty of care.  As an authority well 
known to lawyers and students alike, it is not clear to what extent this case may have blinded 
thinking generally in relation to liability for misleading accounts. Furthermore, in considering 
the negligence point, Bingham LJ found that the provisions contained in the Companies Act 
1985 showed: 
 
“[A] plain parliamentary intention that shareholders in a public company shall receive 
independant and reliable information on the financial standing of the company (and thus of 
their investment) ...to enable the members to make an informed judgment whether, and if so 
how, they should exercise the powers of control enjoyed by them as members.  The 
commercial man’s answer would more probably be: to enable each shareholder to make an 
informed judgment whether he should retain or reduce or increase his holding of shares in the 
company.”158 
 
This is a far cry from the prevailing view of the time, that the purpose of corporate 
accounting and the standard implied by the expression “true and fair view”159 is “to enable 
the members of the company and third parties to obtain all the information contained in the 
company’s financial statements, at a uniform standard of integrity, without having to 
undertake further enquiries.”160  
 
Caparo161 also marked a departure from the approach taken in earlier cases where on similar 
facts a different action had been brought.  For example, in Re London and General Bank (No. 
2)162 it was alleged that the balance sheets did not show the true position in that the dividends 
were paid out of capital and not out of profits. Section 7(6) of the then applicable Companies 
Act 1879 required the auditor to “state whether, in his or their opinion, the balance-sheet 
referred to in the report is a full and fair balance-sheet properly drawn up, so as to exhibit a 
true and correct view of the state of the company’s affairs”.  The directors and auditors were 
found jointly and severally liable to pay the official liquidator the amounts of dividends paid 
out of the capital and, here too, one of the auditors appealed.  Lindley LJ in this case stated 
                                                 
157 In Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337, the House of Lords held that a person could be liable for fraudulent 
mis-statements in relation to representations made in a company prospectus and the Directors’ Liability Act 
1890 extended liability to instances of negligent mis-statement too.  Where a person is induced to acquire shares 
as a result of false mis-statements, the contract can be rescinded whether the mis-statement was made 
fraudulently, negligently or innocently.  This may be actionable under s. 67 Companies Act 1985 which was 
replaced by s. 166 Financial Services Act 1986 or the Misrepresentation Act 1967.  In addition, a fraudulent 
mis-statement could give rise to an action for deceit at common law or fraudulent or negligence mis-statment at 
common law.  See S. Griffin, ‘Damages for mis-statements in company prospectuses’, (1991) 12(11) Co Law 
209-212. 
158 Caparo Industries v Dickman [1989] QB 653 per Bingham LJ at p684.  See too the judgments of the Lords 
of Appeal in Ordinary at [1990] 2 AC 605, for example Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle at 661-2, Lord Bridge of 
Harwich at 626 and Lord Oliver of Aylmerton at 654. 
159 This expression formed the standard since 1947. 
160 See E. Grace and K.P.E. Lasok, “The True and Fair View”, (1989) 10(1) Co Law 13-19 at 17. 
161 Caparo Industries v Dickman [1989] QB 653 and House of Lords judgment at [1990] 2 AC 605. 
162 Re London & General Bank (No. 2) CA [1895] 2 Ch 673. 
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that while the balance sheet and profit and loss account were true and correct, they were 
nevertheless entirely misleading and misrepresented the real position of the company. 
Caparo163 also approved Al Saudi Banque [1990],164 in which the fact that it was highly 
probable that the company would need to borrow money did not make the auditor liable to 
potential lenders. That being said, s. 507(1) Companies Act 2006 creates a criminal offence 
of knowingly or recklessly causing an auditor’s report to include any matter that is 
misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular.   
 
If the raison d’etre of most off balance sheet financing is the concealment of relevant 
information,165 it is lamentable that the law has not been utilised to greater effect, particularly 
given the government’s failure to implement its promise to outlaw such activity as far back as 
1988.166 However, the approach taken in the early criminal cases in which convictions were 
imposed for manipulation of company accounts is now bolstered by more recent case law 
which demonstrates that the criminal law will intervene even where there has been no wrong 
at civil law.167  The 2001 case of R v Hinks168 was ground-breaking in that the defendant’s 
conviction for theft was upheld169 notwithstanding the court’s acceptance that she had 
received an otherwise indefeasible gift.170 Criminal culpability, it is argued, should not be 
constrained by civil concepts;171 the criminal law has a different role and purpose, not least to 
delimit acceptable behaviour and punish the wrongdoer,172 and its efficacy lies in the 
flexibility achieved via judicial redefinition in the case law.173 Concerned that a narrow 
definition of appropriation would place beyond the reach of the criminal law dishonest 
persons who should be found guilty, Lord Steyn observed: 
                                                 
163 Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 per L. Bridge at p. 623 and L. Jauncey at p. 662. 
164 Al Saudi Banque v Clark Pixey [1990] Ch 313. 
165 Grace and Lasok, (n 160). 
166 See The Times August 17, 1988 p.20, 21. 
167 The acceptability of this inconsistency between civil and criminal law is controversial, see for example 
A.T.H. Smith, “Constructive Trusts in the Law of Theft” [1977] Crim Law R 395; J.C. Smith, “Theft” (1998) 
Crim Law R 904 and “Theft”, [2001] Crim Law R 162 and “Civil Law Concepts in the Criminal Law” [1972B] 
Cambridge Law Journal; W. Holland, The Law of Theft and Related Offences (Carswell Pubs, 1998); S. 
Gardner, “Property and Theft”, (1998) Crim Law R 35; S. Shute and J. Horder, “Thieving and Deceiving: What 
is the Difference?” [1993] 56 Modern Law Review 548; G. Williams, “Theft and Voidable Title” [1981] Crim 
Law Rev 548. 
168 R. v. Hinks [2001]  2 AC 241, [2000] 4 All ER 833, [2000] 3 WLR 1590, [2001] 1 Cr App Rep 252, 165 JP 
21, 144 SJ LB 265. 
169 The certified question put to the House of Lords was whether the acquisition of an indefeasible title is 
capable of amounting to an appropriation of property belonging to another for the purposes of s. 1(1) Theft Act 
1968.  The majority answered in the affirmative. 
170 Earlier controversial cases were those of Lawrence [1972] AC 626 H. L. and Gomez [1993] AC 442 H.L. in 
both of which it was held that an “appropriation” for the purposes of the theft offence (at Theft Act 1968, s1) 
could amount to an instance whereby property passed with the owner’s consent.  Both cases involved criminal 
activity, albeit they would have been more properly charged as a s15 obtaining by deception, and both involved 
contractual transactions that were tainted by an established vitiating factor such that they were both voidable at 
civil law.  In Hinks, the Court of Appeal considered an undue influence argument in relation to the gift but this 
line of argument did not feature in the subsequent appeal to the House of Lords. 
171 In its 2002 Report on Fraud (Law Com No. 276, 2002), the Law Commission noted that it had informally 
proposed that a defendant should not be dishonest if he has a legal right to do what he is doing, however, there 
had been strong opposition from the CPS, the SFO and the Law Society who were concerned at the complexity 
that would be added to the criminal law by importing civil law concepts.  
172 See for example, W Holland, The Law of Theft and Related Offences (Carswell Pubs 1998); W. Freidman, 
Law in a Changing Society (2nd ed., Penguin Books 1972); G. William & B. A. Hepple, Foundations of the Law 
of Tort (2nd ed. Butterworths, 1984) 
173 Notably, the civil law achieves this through the dual system of the superior body of equitable rules which 
mitigate the harshness of the common law, a feature which is absent from the criminal law. 
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“While in some contexts of the law of theft a judge cannot avoid explaining civil law 
concepts to a jury ... the decisions of the House of Lords eliminate the need for such 
explanations in respect of appropriation. That is a great advantage in an overly complex 
corner of the law”.174  
 
One consequence of Hinks175 is that dishonesty becomes determinative of criminality, absent  
any otherwise unlawful behaviour, where that behaviour conforms to the offence definition.  
The effect of this controversial decision was not lost on the Law Commission who recognised 
that “(a)ctivities which would otherwise be legitimate can therefore become fraudulent if a 
jury is prepared to characterise them as dishonest”.176  Thus, for example, the dealer who 
dishonestly buys an antique at a gross undervalue is protected in civil law by the rule of 
caveat vendor, but this would not in itself be a defence to the fraud offence.177 The 
application of this approach to the problem of OBSF and the criminal law of fraud is not 
inconceivable, notwithstanding compliance with the letter of both the civil law and 
accounting rules. 
 
In line with theft, and the Hinks178 authority, conviction for fraud may turn on finding of 
dishonesty.179  Dishonesty is a simple question of fact for a jury and only in cases of doubt is 
the Ghosh180 direction given.  Ghosh defines dishonesty by reference to a two-stage test:181 
first, the jury must consider “whether according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and 
honest people what was done was dishonest”.  If answered in the affirmative, the jury must 
then go on to consider “whether the defendant himself must have realised that what he was 
doing was [by the standards of reasonable and honest people] dishonest.” If satisfied on both 
limbs, the jury will find the defendant dishonest. Case law in this area is illuminative.  In 
Buzalek [1991],182 for example, the defendant’s case was that he was not dishonest but had 
told ‘white lies’ for the greater good and with the well-intentioned objective of keeping two 
companies afloat. The court rejected this defence, finding that he had lied in order to get 
banks to extend credit when they would not have done so had they known the truth.  In 
contrast a similarly altruistic defence was also ultimately unsuccessful in the 2007 case of 
Gohill,183 where there was arguably both a civil and criminal wrong. In this case the 
defendants, who were convicted of theft and false accounting, made no charge for hiring 
equipment to certain customers, accepting instead a small personal tip; the defendants had 
acted to promote the business and in the interests of customer care, such that the business 
would benefit in the long run. The defence submitted, unsuccessfully, that there had been no 
dishonesty. 
 
Whether juries would convict in instances of misleading accounting practices remains to be 
seen and, ultimately, guilt would be determined on a case-by-case basis by reference to 
criminal law principles.  Plainly, legal and accounting compliance may be a factor perceived 
                                                 
174 Hinks (n 168) 4 All ER 833 at 843. 
175 Hinks (n 168). 
176 Law Commission, Report on Fraud (No. 276, 2002), at para 3.8, p 14. 
177 This is the example provided in by the Law Commission in its Report on Fraud (2002), at para 7.64, p 74. 
178 Hinks (n168). 
179 See Fraud Act 2006, s. 2(1)(a) s. 3(a) and s. 4(1)(b). 
180 Ghosh [1982] QB 1053. 
181 Ibid., p. 1064D-E 
182 Buzalek [1991] Crim Law R 130 
183 DPP v. Gohill [2007] EWHC 239. 
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as relevant by a jury,184 as may the defendant’s belief that he had a legal right to act he did,185 
but it need not be determinative of the issue. A very difficult - and notoriously circular- 
question is whether and how accounts can be regarded as misleading or dishonest if they are 
prepared in compliance with the relevant law and accounting standards. The conflict arises 
from the requirement that accounts should comply with the law and show a true and fair view 
or, in relation to companies’ financial years which begin on or after January 1st, 2005, 
whether they comply with IAS, where appropriate.186 There has been a substantial debate as 
to the overriding nature of the requirement to show a true and fair view187and more recently 
as to what extent IFRS actually require a true and fair view to be shown.188 This debate is 
relevant to this article because, as defence counsel argued in the Argyll Foods case, “true and 
fair means not misleading” but also that “there was room for more than one true and fair 
view”.189 Yet the magistrates there nonetheless concluded that the accounts did not show a 
true and fair view and therefore did not comply with the law. We argue in this article that the 
rationale for the invocation of the criminal law is deterrence of dishonest behaviour. If the 
motivation for utilising OBSF might be perceived in effect to be to choose one true and fair 
view over another, for example to allow a company to raise capital from investors that some 
investors might otherwise not be prepared to subscribe for, or to circumvent a borrowing 
limit in the articles of association imposed by shareholders for their protection, then this 
might appear dishonest. We are not, of course, arguing that the use of OBSF was in such 
circumstances per se dishonest – that could only be determined on the basis of evidence of 
relevant motive. 
 
Indeed, the decision as regards criminality in Hinks190 appears entirely consistent with a 
substance over form regulatory approach. That being said, the use of the general criminal law 
to address the publication of misleading accounts through the employment of off balance 
sheet finance would mark a radical departure from the contemporary response. The fact that 
the distortion of information in this context is not treated as criminal may well result in the 
perception that is not in fact criminal in any circumstance.  However, perception is important, 
given the subjective element of dishonesty and the circularity of the test such that conduct is 
                                                 
184 See Law Commission Report, Report on Fraud (No. 276, 2002), at para 7.65 at p 74. 
185 Ibid. 
186  The relevant provisions during the period preceding the banking crisis would have been Companies Act 
1985 ss. 226 – 227 as amended by Companies Act 1989 ss. 4(1) and 5(1) as from April 1, 1990 and as 
substituted by new ss. 226, 226A, 226B, 227, 227A – 227C by the Companies Act 1985 (International 
Accounting Standards and Other Accounting Amendments) Regs 2004, SI 2004/2947, reg. 2 as from November 
12, 2004. With effect from April 6, 2008, the current provisions are set out in Companies Act 2006 ss. 393, 396 
and 397. 
187 L. Hoffman QC and MH Arden “Legal Opinion Obtained by Accounting Standards Committee of True and 
Fair View, With Particular Reference to the Role of Accounting Standards” (September 13, 1983); L. Hoffman 
and M.H. Arden “The Accounting Standards Committee Supplementary Joint Opinion” (March 20, 1984); M.H. 
Arden “Accounting Standards Board The True and Fair Requirement Opinion” (April 21, 1993); Lasok (n. 160). 
188 See Financial Reporting Council “The True and Fair Requirement Revisited, Opinion of Martin Moore QC” 
(FRC; 2008); Financial Reporting Council “True and Fair” (FRC; July 2011). P.L. Davies and S. Worthington 
in Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) p. 765 observe that the position is 
“probably the same” with IAS accounts based on the requirement in IAS 1 that the accounts present fairly but 
add robustly in fn. 85 that if this is not the case there is a “flat contradiction” between s. 393 and companies’ 
obligations under the IAS Regulation.  
189 Ashton (n 56). This may also give rise to some interesting questions of EU law, see Financial Reporting 
Council “The True and Fair Requirement Revisited, Opinion of Martin Moore QC”, op. cit., pp. 27 – 29, where 
Martin Moore concluded that EC jurisprudence should not be seen as in effect creating a hierarchy of “true and 
fair views” but simply that what might have been a true and fair view in one situation might not necessarily be 
so in another. Such questions fall outside the scope of this article. 
190 Hinks (n168). 
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only dishonest if reasonable and honest people consider it dishonest. Considerations of this 
nature may have acted as some restraint on pursuing a novel prosecution of this nature, 
particularly in the absence of direct precedent and since a prosecution can only be brought 
following a decision that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of 
conviction. 
 
Historically, there has been a demonstrable reluctance to criminalise corporate wrongdoing, 
evidenced in the approach taken in the regulation of business activity generally.191  Although 
this may cloud our current notion of corporate crime, there is very recent evidence of an 
increased tendency to control corporate behaviour through the mechanism of the criminal 
law.192  The criminal law is thus a reflection of the prevailing morality of the time193 and, 
conversely, it can be used specifically to delimit acceptable behaviour194 where there is a 
pressing social need to change people’s attitude to some kinds of conduct.195  The recently 
enacted Bribery Act 2010, which sets out liability for corruption offences, is designed to 
“reinforce ethical conduct in the commercial world and society generally”.196  The bribery 
offence is constructed on the premise that the main harm caused by corruption is that inflicted 
on economic markets.197  In this respect, clear parallels can be drawn with the impact of 
                                                 
191 This reluctance can be dated to our earliest attempts to deal with corporate fraud, see the early company 
legislation e.g. Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 and see too D. Hay, “Property, Authority and the Criminal 
Law” in D. Hay and P. Linebaugh et al (eds), Albion’s Fatal Tree (Allen Lane 1975);  W.R. Cornish and G. 
Clark, Law and Society in England 1750-1950 (Sweet and Maxwell 1989);  M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: 
The Birth of A Prison (Harmondsworth Penguin 1977);  K.J.M. Smith, Lawyers, Legislators and Theorists: 
Developments in English Criminal Jurisprudence 1800-1957 (Clarendon Press, 1998); A. Norrie, Crime, 
Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (2nd ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001).    
192 Law Commission, “Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts” (Consultation Paper No. 195, 2010), para. 
7.16 at p. 136 identifying that a large quantity of new criminal legislation has been targeted at business activity.  
See too the same consultation paper at para 3.83 at p. 46 in which the Consumer Protection Act 1987 is 
discussed, noting that, “A key function of the Act was to provide better remedies for consumers in civil law.  
However, P. Cartwright in Consumer Protection and the Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001) p. 63 argues that “the criminal law has tended to be the primary means by which the state has 
sought to protect consumers from unsafe products”.  See also, for example, the Bribery Act 2010 which takes a 
zero tolerance approach to corporate corruption; The Secretary of State for Justice, then Jack Straw, when 
addressing the 5th European Forum on Anti-corruption in June 2009, “A strong legal architecture is necessary in 
tackling corruption..Ultimately our aim must be to bring about behavioural change within businesses 
themselves, creating corporate cultures in which no form of corruption is tolerated.” 
193 Rather, the criminal law can only be understood by reference to historical contingencies in the political, 
social and economic context.  For recent proponents of this view see for example R. Dagger, “Republicanism 
and the Foundations of Criminal Law”’ in R.A. Duff and S. Green (ed.), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); R.A. Duff, L. Farmer et al, The Boundaries of the Criminal Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
194 There is a line of argument that suggests that crime was simply an instrument of governance and used to 
shape conduct, J. Simon, “Governing Through Crime” in L.M. Friedman and G. Fisher (eds) The Crime 
Conundrum: Essays on Criminal Justice (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997) 174; W. Friedman,  Law In 
A Changing Society (2nd ed,, Penguin Books, 1972).  Certainly, the expressive function of the criminal law is not 
controversial, it is accepted as a means not only of articulating condemnation but also of providing authoritative 
statements about moral and social values,,  L. Zedner, Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
195 Law Commission, “Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts” (Consultation Paper No 195 2010), para 4.16 
at  p. 70.  Modern examples would include the contemporary view of ‘drink driving’; marital rape, R. v R [1992] 
1 AC 599, [1991] 3 WLR 767, HL; corruption per Bribery Act 2010. 
196 Ministry of Justice, Impact Assessment of the Bill on Reform of the Law of Bribery (2009). 
197 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery” (Consultation Paper 185, 2007), Appendix D at D5 and citing P. 
Alldridge, “The Law Relating to Free Lunches”, (2002) 23 Company Lawyer 264, 267. 
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OBSF on the market economy.198  Notwithstanding the analogy that can be made, the Bribery 
Act takes a radical, zero-tolerance approach to the problem, using a robust general criminal 
law to deter corporate wrongdoing.199 This tendency can also be identified in the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 as regards the money laundering offences.200  In principle, therefore, and to 
prevent the same harm, there would appear to be little objection to extending the same 
approach to OBSF.  
 
Accounts related offences  
 
The approach of successive companies’ legislation to misleading accounts by the time of the 
banking crisis had become excessively light touch. False statements in “any return, report, 
certificate, balance sheet, or other document required by or for the purposes of this Act” had 
been made a misdemeanour as early as s. 28 CA 1900, which coincided with the introduction 
of a requirement for companies generally to produce an annual audited balance sheet.201 The 
maximum penalty was punishment on indictment by two years’ imprisonment with or 
without hard labour.202 However, the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 commenced the 
practice of limiting the false statements offence to specified provisions of the Act listed in a 
Schedule. Nonetheless, this extended to the requirement for a balance sheet contained in the 
annual summary.203 This offence was re-enacted in the Companies Act 1929 with a proviso 
that:  
 
“[I]f the last ... balance sheet did not comply with the requirements of the law as in force at 
the date of the audit with respect to the form of balance sheets there shall be made such 
additions to and corrections in the said copy as would have been required to make it comply 
... .”204 
 
The Companies Act 1948 retained the false statements offence205 and introduced a specific 
offence where a director failed to take all reasonable steps to secure compliance with 
requirement for the balance sheet and profit and loss account to show a true and fair view and 
comply with the specific requirements of the Act as to content and form, the maximum 
sentence on summary conviction for which was imprisonment for 6 months or a £200 fine.206 
                                                 
198 See the National Fraud Strategic Authority’s National Fraud Strategy 2009-2010, “A New Approach to 
Combating Fraud” and the Attorney General’s Foreword, Rt Hon Baroness Scotland QC, “Economic confidence 
is essential for investment, spending and ultimately prosperity in our communities.  However, ... the continued 
presence of fraud within our economy cannot help in rebuilding this much needed trust ... (to) strengthen our 
communities and economy”. 
199 See too Bribery Act s. 7 which imposes criminal liability on the organisation on the basis of a failure to 
prevent bribery. 
200 For example at Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 s. 330. 
201 Companies Act 1900 Ss. 21 – 23. The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 had required directors of the 
unlimited liability corporations registered under the Act to ensure that a “full and fair” balance sheet was made 
up and filed, together with an auditors’ report, with the Registrar of Companies, s. 43 but this had been repealed 
by the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856. 
202 CA 1900, s. 28. 
203 CCA 1908 s. 26 refers to “the statement, in the form of a balance sheet, audited by the company’s auditors, 
and containing a summary of its share capital, its liabilities, and its assets, giving such particulars as will 
disclose the general nature of those liabilities and assets, and how the values of the fixed assets have been 
arrived at, but the balance sheet need not include a statement of profit and loss.” 
204 Companies Act 1929 s. 362 and Sch. 11, referring to Companies Act 1929 s. 108.  
205 CA 1948 Sch. 6 set out the requirements for the annual return which, in accordance with s. 127(1) included 
certified copies of the accounts except, broadly, where the company was an exempt private company. 
206 Companies Act 1948 S. 149(6), with the proviso that there should be no imprisonment unless the offence was 
wilful.  
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It seems likely that this formed the basis of the Argyll Foods Ltd prosecution discussed by 
Ashton, where it was concluded by the magistrates that the 1979 accounts did not show a true 
and fair view and so contravened the Companies Act 1948, a case regarded as setting an 
important precedent.207 The directors in question were conditionally discharged and no other 
formal penalties were imposed.208 A significant amendment was introduced by the 
Companies Act 1981 stating explicitly that the requirement to give a true and fair view 
overrode the new Sch. 8 (containing detailed accounting disclosure requirements) and other 
requirements of the Act as to the matters to be included in a company’s accounts or notes,209 
in contrast to the Companies Act 1948 statement that Sch. 8 was “without prejudice to” the 
true and fair view and any other requirements of the Act.210 The Companies Act 1985 
abandoned the general false statements offence altogether in favour of specific offences set 
out in the Act, with all criminal offences under the Act being listed in Sch. 24, 22 pages in 
total. Significantly, it created offences of laying or filing “defective accounts”, being in the 
case of individual accounts those that did “not comply with the requirements of this Act as to 
the matters to be included in, or in a note to, those accounts”, and in the case of group 
accounts those that failed to comply with specific, but very broadly drafted, provisions of the 
Act.211 However, the maximum penalty for this was on indictment a fine and on summary 
prosecution the statutory maximum – no imprisonment.212 Further changes were made by the 
Companies Act 1989, applicable from April 1st, 1990, which located the offence within the 
provision relating to the approval and signing of accounts, making it an offence to knowingly 
or recklessly approve accounts, defined by reference to both individual and group accounts, 
which did not comply with the Act.213 This was amended as from November 12th, 2004, to 
additionally apply to accounts that did not comply with Art. 4 of the IAS Regulation, where 
applicable.214 This was re-enacted as s. 414 Companies Act 2006, with effect from April 6th, 
2008, the penalty remaining non-imprisonable. Significantly, however, s. 1112 Companies 
Act 2006 created a new “General false statement offence”, with effect from October 1st, 
2009, which provides that it is an offence to file a document or make a statement that is 
“misleading, false or deceptive”, for which the maximum penalty on indictment is two years’ 
imprisonment, a fine or both. While this was developed in the context of general filing 
requirements, the wording would appear sufficiently general to cover accounts. In a sense this 
is odd because it overlaps significantly with s. 5 Perjury Act 1911, that makes it a 
misdemeanour punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment and a fine on indictment to 
“knowingly and wilfully make a statement false in a material particular” where the statement 
is made in various settings including “an ... account, balance sheet ... report, return, or other 
document” which he is “authorised or required to make ...” by any public statute.215 
 
                                                 
207 Ashton (n 56) pp. 3, 7 and 11. 
208 Ibid., p. 7. 
209 Companies Act 1948 s. 149 as inserted by s. 1 Companies Act 1981 s. 1  . 
210 Companies Act 1948 S. 149(3). 
211 Companies Act 1985 Ss. 229(5) to (7) and 230; s. 229(6) permitted group accounts, for example, to be 
prepared in non-consolidated form and  s. 230, for example, specifically required group accounts to give a true 
and fair view.  
212 CA 1985 Sch. 24. 
213 Companies Act 1989 s. 233(5).  
214 Companies Act 1985 (International Accounting Standards and Other Accounting Amendments) Regs 
2004/2947 Reg. 3, Sch. 1, paras. 1, 10, applicable to companies’ financial years which began on or after January 
1, 2005. 
215 See the comments of the then Lord Chancellor and Viscount Colville of Culross as to its significance on the 
enactment of s. 17 Theft Act 1968, Hansard HL, March 12, 1968, including by the latter that “it is hardly the 
place that .. one would expect to look, in a sensible, modern, revised criminal law, for something to do with 
false accounting.” 
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There is an alternative – and more serious - offence in s. 17 Theft Act 1968, which deals 
specifically with false accounting. Curiously, its origins can be traced back to early company 
law. The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 introduced by Gladstone in the wake of serious 
corporate scandals included in s. 31 a single general criminal offence to address acts of fraud 
or wilful omission by directors or officers, including falsification or fraudulent erasure of 
“Books of Account ... or any Document”. This was repealed by the Companies Act 1856 and 
replaced with a provision applicable in insolvency only.216 The flurry of publicity from the 
successful Royal British Bank prosecution for the long-standing common law offence of 
conspiracy to defraud, however, led the then Attorney General, Sir Richard Bethell, to ask 
leave to bring in the Fraudulent Trustees Act 1857. The general criminal law to the present 
day was to emerge from a group of provisions in ss. 5 to 8 of this Act, which applied to 
directors, members and public officers of corporate bodies and public companies.217 In 
particular, s. 6 made keeping fraudulent accounts a misdemeanour, and s. 7 the wilful 
destruction of books, which extended to making or concurring in a false entry or material 
omission in books and accounts. This group of provisions went on to be consolidated in ss. 81 
to 84 Larceny Act 1861, where ss. 82 and 83 were subsequently consolidated with the 
Falsification of Accounts Act 1875, which applied to employees,218 into s. 17 Theft Act 1968. 
The substantive offence under s. 17 is not limited to any category of person or organisational 
form. It includes the falsification of any account, record or document and can be committed 
simply by producing or using them knowing that they are or may be misleading, false or 
deceptive “in furnishing information for any purpose”. In contrast to the Companies Act 
offences dealing with defective accounts, however, dishonesty is required.219 It is also 
necessary to show that the act has taken place “with a view to gain for himself or another or 
with intent to cause loss”.  It is noteworthy that this is not restricted by the categories of 
potential victims,  in contrast to s. 19 Theft Act, discussed below, which criminalises making 
false statements by company directors to members or creditors of the company with intent to 
deceive.220 Further, s. 17(2) establishes that the omission of material particulars can have the 
effect of falsifying the accounts and, favouring the substance over form approach, they may 
be misleading for the purpose of s. 17(1)(b)221 even if there are no outright lies. A defendant 
under s. 17 is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for up to 7 years.222  
 
What conclusions can be drawn as to the adequacy of accounts related criminal offences to 
address OBSF? From a prosecutor’s perspective the Companies Acts offences relating to 
defective accounts would appear the more attractive to prosecute: the lesser standard of 
recklessness, as opposed to dishonesty, is required and, whilst the sanction may be non-
                                                 
216 CA 1856 s. 79. 
217 Fraudulent Trustees Act 1957 ss. 5 to 8.  
218 Dishonest clerks often escaped on indictments for embezzlement because it was hard to prove an 
appropriation, hence the Falsification of Accounts Act 1875 was enacted making it a misdemeanour, punishable 
with 7 years’ penal servitude for a clerk or servant wilfully, and with intent to defraud, to alter, or make false 
entry in, or omit a material particular from any account of his master. 
219 The Court of Appeal in Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 set out principles for deciding whether an accused is 
dishonest.  The first limb asks whether the conduct is dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and 
honest people; if so, the second limb considers whether the defendant himself realise that his actions were 
dishonest by those standards. 
220 The false accounting offence at s. 17 does, however, require proof of dishonesty and s. 19 applies only to 
existing members and creditors.   
221 Theft Act 1968 s. 17(1)(b) makes it an offence for a person to dishonestly, with a view to gain for himself or 
another or with intent to cause loss to another, to furnish “information for any purpose produces or makes use of 
any account , or any such record or document as aforesaid, which to his knowledge is or may be misleading, 
false or deceptive in a material particular”.  See too Neil [2008] EWCA Crim 478 and Kylsant [1932] 1 KB 442. 
222 Theft Act 1968 s. 17(1). 
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imprisonable, the Argyll Foods Ltd case demonstrated, by the galaxy of witnesses that were 
called, the seriousness with which such a prosecution is treated by a substantial company, 
even where the trial took place in a magistrates’ court. The disadvantages, however, are 
weighty: the need to show that the accounts did not comply with the Act (including since 
2004, the IAS Regulation), is likely to bog any prosecution down with complex and difficult 
questions of accounting law and practice debated by respectable experts on both sides. Any 
prosecution under the Theft Act would not necessarily avoid these issues. For example, a key 
requirement of accounts under the Companies Acts is that they show a true and fair view. 
Ironically, the more recently enacted s. 1112 Companies Act 2006 begins to appear more 
attractive, the sanction being 2 years’ imprisonment, with proof of recklessness and that the 
document is misleading replacing the Theft Act requirements to demonstrate dishonesty and 
motive. The offence under the Perjury Act 1911 would be of little assistance since it only 
applies where the statement is in fact false. 
 
Share market related offences  
 
The approach of financial services law towards various offences originally designed to deal 
with fraudulently inducing a person to become a shareholder charted a similar path to the 
false statements offences in company law, with originally weighty criminal offences 
downgraded to a light touch civil offence regime. The current regime is now set out in Part 7 
Financial Services Act 2012 and covers misleading statements (s. 89), impressions (s. 90) and 
statements in relation to benchmarks (s. 91), the latter a response to the recent LIBOR 
scandal.223  It originated with s. 12(1) Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939, which 
appears to have been modelled on s. 84 Larceny Act 1861, discussed below. Section 12(1) 
applied where “any person” made “statements, promises and forecasts” that were “deceptive, 
induces, or attempts to induce” “another person” to “enter or offer to enter” an agreement 
relating to securities.224 This was later re-enacted in s. 13 Prevention of Fraud (Investments) 
Act 1958. There was a division of judicial opinion as to whether it would suffice that a 
defendant had been seriously and inexcusably negligent in failing to ensure a statement, etc. 
was not false or unfounded,225 which was resolved by s. 22(1)(a) Protection of Depositors 
Act 1963, making it apply whether or not there was dishonesty. The Prevention of Fraud 
(Investments) Act 1958 was repealed by the Financial Services Act 1986 and replaced by a 
very different regime, governing the conduct of investment business generally.226 
Nevertheless, s. 47(1) Financial Services Act 1986 recreated an offence along similar lines, 
the key difference relating to the need to show that a person had broadly been induced to 
enter into an “investment agreement” as defined. Section 47(2) added a new offence where a 
person’s course of conduct created a false or misleading impression as to the market, price or 
value of investments. Section 397 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 replaced the 
Financial Services Act 1986 provisions.  These have now been largely re-stated and extended 
in ss. 89 and 90 Financial Services Act 2012 with the addition of a new offence in s. 91, as 
above. 
 
Section 89 criminalises knowingly making a false or misleading statement, the reckless 
making of such a statement or the dishonest concealment of material facts in connection with 
                                                 
223 Commenced April 1, 2013. 
224 “Securities” were defined in Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act s. 26(1) as “shares or debentures, or 
rights or interests ... in any shares or debentures”. 
225 R.R. Pennington, The Law of the Investment Markets (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 41. 
226 FSA 1986 s. 212(3) and Sch 17 Part 1. 
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the statement where there is the relevant intention.227 A person can therefore be convicted 
where he neither misleads nor intends to mislead and, of note, recklessness has been 
construed in relation to earlier such provisions to import an objective, rather than subjective, 
assessment of the conduct.228 This is significant in that the objective approach to fault 
attribution is infrequently found in offences that are considered “truly criminal” but is a 
common characteristic in the regulatory context, the latter comprising rules that are not 
enforced directly in court but are implemented by the regulator229 subject to appeal to a 
tribunal.  Similarly, the burden of proof for “offences” has been likened to the lower standard 
applicable in civil proceedings and, therefore, it might be concluded that, although the 
regulator’s powers mimic the substantive criminal law, breach of a Pt. 7 offence may be 
considered a mere “civil offence”, typical of the regulatory regime.230 The maximum penalty, 
however, is on conviction on indictment 7 years’ imprisonment and a fine, much more 
serious than the defective accounting offence under company law.231 
 
There is again an alternative – and more serious – general criminal offence set out in s. 19 
Theft Act 1968. Ironically, as with the comparable false accounting provision, the origins of 
this can be traced to early company law with s. 65 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, which 
penalised false pretences as to the patronage of companies, and s. 31, which, as has been 
seen, made fraudulent acts or omissions by directors and officers a misdemeanour. These 
were repealed by the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856. Section 8 Fraudulent Trustees Act 
1857, re-enacted in s. 84 Larceny Act 1861, made it a misdemeanour to publish false 
statements with intent to deceive, defraud or induce a person to become a shareholder, etc. 
(so victims did not have to be existing shareholders).232 Of note, it was not under the 
Companies Act but under s. 84 Larceny Act 1861 that Lord Kylsant was subsequently 
convicted in 1932,233 having published a misleading prospectus for the issue of debenture 
stock.  As with the 1858 Royal British Bank case, discussed below, the prospectus contained 
statements which were of themselves entirely true but, taken as a whole, gave a false 
impression of the position of the company.234  In essence, the company drew on secret 
taxation reserves accrued during a previous abnormal “boom” period to pay dividends and 
provided a 10- year average annual balance; this was misleading in that the information 
implied that the company was profitable whereas it had in fact made large trading losses for 
the previous 7 years. Section 19 Theft Act 1968 now makes it an offence for officers of 
                                                 
227 There must be either an intention or recklessness as to whether making or concealing as above might induce 
a person to make an investment decision of the type set out in the section. 
228 See I. Smith, “Financial Fraud: what does it take to be a fraudster?” (2011) 10 JIBFL 601; R. v Russell 
[1952] 2 All ER 842; R. v MacKinnon [1959] 1 QB 150; L Bingham’s judgment in G [2004] 1 AC 1034 at [28] 
the meaning of ‘recklessly’ and ‘reckless’ remains open, see Blackstone’s Criminal Practice edited by Lord 
Justice Hooper and David Ormerod (OUP, 2011) at B7.24.      
229 The Financial Services Act 2012 has amended s.401 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 so that the 
Financial Conduct Authority is now granted the power to prosecute Pt 7 offences in place of the Financial 
Services Authority. 
230 A. Haynes, “Market abuse, fraud and misleading communications”, (2012) 19(3) JoFC 234-254.  For an 
excellent explanation see A. Hudson, The Law of Finance (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009) 14-15. 
231 FSMA 2000 s. 397(8). 
232 Fraudulent Trustees Act 1857 s. 8 would appear to overlap with the false pretences offences and s. 14 
provided that if an offence appeared to be larceny the person on trial would not be entitled to acquittal of a 
misdemeanour under this offence (oddly not repeated in Larceny Act 1861 s. 84). 
233 R v. Kylsant [1932] 1 KB 442 (the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company case). 
234 Of note, the Court of Appeal judges, Avory, Branson and Humphreys JJ, were not referred to the British 
Royal Bank authority and decided the point by reference to 3 civil cases, Gluckstein v Barnes [1900] AC 240; 
Peek v Gurney (1873) LR 6 HL 377 and Aaron’s Reefs Ltd v Twiss [1896] AC 273, in which it was fortunate 
that Lord Halsbury had expressed his view with regard to criminal, as well as civil, liability, at 284. 
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organisations generally including a body corporate to publish, etc. a misleading, etc. “written 
statement or account” with intent to deceive “members or creditors”. It differs from the 
earlier legislation as it does not require the document to be used with intent to induce 
someone to become a shareholder but is limited to existing members (i.e. not prospective 
members). The maximum sentence on conviction on indictment is 7 years’ imprisonment.235  
 
Superficially, there would appear to be some incentives for a prosecutor to rely on the share 
market offences rather than those specifically related to accounts. The combination of a 
substantial maximum penalty of 7 years’ imprisonment, the lower standard of mens rea for 
the FSA 2012 offence and the generality of the requirement to show a false statement as 
opposed to non-compliance with the Companies Act accounting requirements would all be 
attractive. However, there is no case law as to whether accounts constitute a statement as 
required by FSA 2012.  Similarly, the mens rea essentially requires proof that the defendant 
intended to, or was reckless as to whether a person entered into or refrained, etc. From 
entering into, etc. a relevant agreement, which might prove a difficult obstacle. The 
generality of s. 19 Theft Act might, therefore, be more attractive. It carries a similar 
maximum penalty and publication of an account is specifically covered, though, oddly, intent 
to deceive is restricted to existing members or creditors rather than potential shareholders, as 
had been the case under the Larceny Act. The need to prove intention to deceive in relation to 
s. 19 may be more difficult to prove than dishonesty at s. 17, in which case the s. 1112 
provision still looks the most promising so far.      
 
Offences in relation to winding up 
 
There have long been specific offences relating to the destruction, etc. of company books, etc. 
in the context of insolvency law that have extended to falsification of books of account. The 
origins of such legislation can be traced to s. 114 Joint Stock Companies Winding Up Act 
1848 (JSCA), which made it an offence to destroy company books, etc. broadly in 
contemplation of the winding up. This specifically extended to making any false or fraudulent 
entry in books of account or other documents with intent to defraud creditors or 
contributories, and was made a misdemeanour, punishable by a maximum of two years’ 
imprisonment. This was carried forward into subsequent companies’ legislation in 1856, 
1862, 1908, 1929, 1948, 1985 and 1986.236 Section 271 Companies Act 1929 created a large 
number of specific insolvency offences, including broadly similar conduct carried out within 
12 months of the commencement of a company’s winding up. The maximum penalty was 
also 2 years for this offence, which contained additional and specific defences. This was 
again carried forward into subsequent companies’ legislation in 1948, 1985 and 1986.237 
However, the 1985 legislation increased the criminal penalty for both offences to a maximum 
of 7 years’ imprisonment.238 
 
The use of insolvency offences is obviously limited to those situations where the company in 
question becomes insolvent and is, therefore, likely only to be of limited value as it is a 
relatively uncommon occurrence for the sort of large listed companies that typically engage 
in complex OBSF activities. Nonetheless, it cannot be ruled out as the use of OBSF itself 
                                                 
235 Theft Act 1968, s. 19(1).  
236 JSCA 1856, s. 79; CA 1862, s. 166;  Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 s. 216;CA 1929 s. 272; CA 1948 
s. 329, CA 1985 s. 627; and CA 1986 s. 209. 
237 CA 1948 s. 328; CA 1985 s. 624(2); and IA 1986 s. 206. 
238 CA 1985 s. 627(2); and s. 624(6) CA 1985 and CA 1985 Sch. 24 CA 1985. See now Insolvency Act 1986 
Sch. 10. 
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may increase the probability of a company becoming insolvent, and furthermore the powers 
and responsibilities of a liquidator make it more likely that the liquidator will be able to 
obtain information about the use of OBSF that may be hidden while the company is a going 
concern. Section 206 Insolvency Act 1986 makes various forms of conduct within 12 months 
of winding up a criminal offence, including concealing a debt due from the company, the 
falsification of books or papers relating to the company’s affairs and fraudulent omissions in 
any document affecting the company’s property or affairs; a defence is available to the 
concealment offence of proving that there was no intention to defraud, and in relation to the 
falsification offence that there was  no intent to conceal the state of affairs of the company or 
defeat the law. This provision is, however, unlikely to be helpful with OBSF as the 12-month 
period is likely to be too short, such conduct may well have taken place over a longer period 
of time. Section 209 Insolvency Act 1986 is more promising as it makes it a criminal offence 
to falsify the company’s books, etc. with intent to defraud or deceive any person. 
Furthermore, unlike the comparable provision under s. 17 Theft Act 1968, which carries the 
same maximum penalty, there is no need to show a view to gain or causing loss.   
 
General fraud based offences requiring dishonesty 
 
The centuries-old common law offence of conspiracy to defraud has been preserved by s. 
5(2) Criminal Law Act 1977, when common law conspiracy was generally abolished. Early 
on it was used for false statements, for example, R. v De Berenger (1814)239 where false 
rumours of Napoleon’s death and imminent peace with France were spread to increase the 
price of government securities.  The possibility of the manipulation of accounts being 
regarded as conspiracy to defraud can be traced back to 1858 and the case of R v Esdaile & 
others, commonly known as the Royal British Bank trial.240 During the trial it was alleged 
that certain directors of the bank241 had conspired to defraud by false representations of 
solvency. Their crime involved including bad debts as an asset on the balance sheets without 
stating that they had effectively been “written off”, declaring and paying a dividend of 6 per 
cent knowing it should not be paid and fraudulently issuing new shares. “Although the 
balance sheet truly represented the books, it would be fraudulent ...” because the defendants 
knew the true state of affairs.242  The directors were duly convicted of “intending to deceive, 
defraud and prejudice such of the shareholders of the Royal British Bank as were not aware 
of the true state of affairs of the bank, and to induce the Queen’s subjects to become 
customers and creditors of the bank, and to purchase and hold shares therein” and “did 
conspire falsely and fraudulently to publish and represent that the bank ... were in a sound 
and prosperous condition”.  The directors were found guilty even though they had intended 
no direct personal benefit and had hoped to rescue the bank. The maximum sentence 
available for the common law offence is now 10 years’ imprisonment.243 
 
Historically, it must be borne in mind that the relevant legal provisions would have been 
designed in the shadow of the notorious Bubble Act 1720, which made: 
 
                                                 
239 R v De Berenger & others [1814-23] All ER Rep 513; See A Hudson, Securities Law (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell 2008) at 775. 
240 R v Esdaile (1858) 175 ER 696. 
241 Stapleton, Esdaile, Valient, Macleod, Kennedy and Cameron.   
242 R v Esdaile and Others (1858) 175 ER 696 at 698. 
243 Criminal Justice Act 1987 s. 12(3). The CPS web-site adds “See Attorney General's Guidance of 9/1/2007 
attached to Policy Bulletin 15/2007. Prosecutors will need to specify why this charge is being chosen as opposed 
to any other and will need management approval to charge ...”. See https://gov.uk/use-of-the-common-law-
offence-of-conspiracy-to -defraud-6 [Accessed February 26, 2015]. 
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“All undertakings ... presuming to act as a corporate body ... raising ... transferrable stock ... 
transferring ... shares in such stock ..., either by Act of Parliament or any charter from the 
Crown and acting under any charter ... for raising a capital stock ... not intended  ... by such 
charter ... and all acting ... under any obsolete charter ... for ever be deemed illegal and void”.  
 
In this context, the criminal law gave rise to a number of general offences based on the 
making of false pretences or deception, which might have been expected to be adequate to 
cover such conduct designed to induce a person into buying or selling shares. The earliest 
was introduced by s. 1 Obtaining Money by False Pretences Act 1757, which was extended in 
1812 to specifically cover obtaining bonds and other securities. This was repealed and re-
enacted by s. 53 Larceny Act 1827 which made the offence of obtaining money, et.c a 
misdemeanour; and also noted that “a Failure of Justice frequently arises from the subtle 
Distinction between Larceny and Fraud”, so s. 53 went on to say that there should be no 
acquittal if the way in which property was obtained amounted to larceny and there should be 
no further prosecution for larceny. This offence was further re-enacted in ss. 88, 89 and 90 
Larceny Act 1861, with s. 88 also providing that it was not necessary to show intent to 
defraud any particular person, and finally appeared in s. 32 Larceny Act 1916 in substantially 
the same terms but without the qualifications above. The Theft Act 1968 later addressed 
comparable deception offences with s. 15 criminalizing obtaining property by deception, s. 
15A the obtaining of a money transfer, s. 16 obtaining pecuniary advantage by deception and 
s. 20(2) the procuring the execution of a valuable security, now all repealed by the Fraud Act 
2006. 
 
A more effective deterrent might have been prosecution for fraudulent trading, not least as 
this now carries a potential sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.244 The origins of this can be 
traced back to s. 275 Companies Act 1929, when the offence applied only when the company 
was in the course of winding up.245 This restriction was removed in s. 458 Companies Act 
1985. Section 993 Companies Act 2006 now creates 3 separate fraudulent trading offences: 
carrying on the business with intent to defraud creditors of the company; doing so with the 
intent to defraud the creditors of any person; and being a party to the carrying on of the 
business for any fraudulent purpose. While a single transaction is sufficient to commit either 
of the defrauding creditors offences,246 the fraudulent purpose offence is aimed at the 
carrying on of a business with the requisite intention rather than individual transactions.247 As 
Davies and Worthington note, there is also no limit on the prior period which may be 
scrutinised, the liquidation of the company simply being a condition of the claim.248 
Fraudulent purpose is commonly recognised in instances such as using a company as vehicle 
for a systemic carousel tax fraud,249 however, it need not be the sole or even the dominant 
purpose for which the business is conducted.250 Of note, this offence has been charged in 
situations where accounts have been manipulated: for example, in R. v. Bright251 where 
counts of fraudulent trading were added to the indictment containing charges of conspiracy to 
                                                 
244 Under s. 458 CA 1985  it was a maximum 7 year custodial  rising to 10 years  for offences committed on or 
after January 15, 2007: Sch. 24, column 4 regarding s. 458 being amended by s. 10 Fraud Act 2006. 
245 Re-enacted in Companies Act 1948 s. 332. 
246 Re Gerald Cooper [1978] Ch 262; Lockwood [1986] Crim LR 244. 
247 Morphitis v. Bernasconi [2003] Ch552 pp. 42-49 CA. 
248 P.L. Davies and S. Worthington, Gower & Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2012), p. 228, n. 12. 
249 E.g. Tax tribunal cases of TC02761: Silicon 8 Ltd, July 5, 2013; TC02667: CCA Distribution Ltd (in admin) 
[2013] UKFTT 253 (TC). 
250 R v Philippou (1989) 89 Cr App R 290. 
251  R v Bright [2008] All ER (D) 83 (Mar)  
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defraud where the defendant dishonestly manipulated the accounts of an insurance company 
by keeping claims data off the computer system and the company’s books of account; and R. 
V,  Smith,252 where the defendant was convicted where he had supplied accounts, including 
misleading lists of debtors, supported by false invoices to maintain the credit of a marketing 
company which eventually failed with a deficit of £520,000. Davies and Worthington observe 
that a single charge of fraudulent trading has been regarded as less confusing for a jury than 
numerous charges of individual fraud.253   
 
The Fraud Act 2006 established for the first time a general fraud offence. The Act’s potential 
application to corporate misinformation, and the particular problem of OBSF, is easy to 
discern.  Indeed, in its introduction to the new Act, the Law Commission’s 2002 Report 
particularly highlighted Government’s commitment to address major commercial fraud.254  
Quoting Lord Irvine of Lairg L.C., it stated,  
 
“[T]he ability to respond effectively to major fraud is of the highest priority to the 
government. We recognise that, in recent years, the public has at times felt that those 
responsible for major crimes of the commercial sphere have managed to avoid justice. Even 
when fraud is detected, the present procedures are often cumbersome, and difficult to 
prosecute effectively”. 
 
Accordingly, the report went on to recommend that, “...introducing a single crime of fraud 
would dramatically simplify the law of fraud255... a general offence of fraud would be aimed 
at encompassing fraud in all its forms”.256   
 
In view of the complexity of the current disclosure rules, regulation and criminal legislation, 
the proposition remains most attractive. The Fraud Act clearly envisages prosecutions for 
fraud in the corporate arena.257 However, contradicting its own 2002 Report,258 the Law 
Commission has subsequently proposed that specific regulation by criminal sanction should 
not be used to deal with fraud when the conduct in question is covered by the 2006 Act.259  
 
Heralded for its robust nature and broad-brush drafting, the Fraud Act 2006 avoided the 
pitfalls associated with highly particularized deception offence definitions, and can be 
employed in any dishonest context where there has been the making of a false or misleading 
representation,260 the failure to disclose information where there is a legal duty to disclose 
it261  or the abuse of position.262  The offence would have been committed in these 
circumstances where there was an accompanying intention to make a gain for himself or 
another, or cause a loss, or risk of loss, to another.263 Given that any investment or lending 
                                                 
252 R v Smith [1997] 2 Cr App R 1 (S)  
253 Davies & Worthington, op. cit., p. 227, n. 9, citing R. v. Kemp [1988] QB 645 (CA).  
254 Law Commission, Report on Fraud (2002). 
255 Ibid., p. 3, para. 3. 
256 Ibid., para. 4. 
257 In addition to the Interpretation Act 1978 [provisions], s. 12 implicitly provides that company officers may 
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258 Law Commission, Report On Fraud 2002 (2002).   
259 Law Commission, “Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts”, (2010), p. 10 at 1.39, Proposal 5.  Further, at 
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260 Fraud Act 2006 s. 2. 
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decision carries with it an inherent risk of loss owing to market forces and fluctuation, the 
determinative criminal elements, in effect, must be proof of dishonesty combined with the 
performance of the proscribed behaviour. The maximum penalty on indictment is up to 10 
years’ imprisonment and a fine.264 Thus, s.2 applies to any person who dishonestly makes a 
representation of the company’s financial position that he knew was, or might have been, 
untrue or misleading, for example to investors or potential investors, creditors or potential 
creditors. However, the question as to whether the use of OBSF amounts to a false 
representation is an interesting one and closely related to the earlier discussion regarding 
dishonesty and the implications of the Hinks decision, namely that legal and accounting 
compliance is not necessarily a defence to a criminal allegation where dishonesty is found.265 
Section 3 is more narrowly drawn, the potential criminal liability biting in relation to persons 
who dishonestly fail to disclose information that they are under a legal duty to disclose. At 
first sight, it might seem that this could be jeopardised in the same way as the false 
representation offence, namely whether the information complied with what a director was 
expected to disclose by regulation. However, it is interesting to observe here the developing 
judicial trend in relation to the interpretation of directors’ fiduciary duty of loyalty to the 
company, which, inter alia, encompasses a duty to disclose their own misconduct to the 
company and renders their position closely analogous to that of trustee with the further 
implications that brings. 266 It may appear tempting to rely on s. 4, which relates to the 
dishonest abuse of a position where the person is expected to safeguard the financial interests 
of another.  The use of OBSF might be perceived as a failure to safeguard the interests of 
shareholders or potential shareholders as this might avoid any prosecution becoming 
jeopardised by technical expert questions as to regulatory compliance. However, this would 
raise an interesting question as to whether directors were expected to protect the interests of 
the company as an abstract legal entity or instead the individual shareholders or perhaps a 
group of shareholders.  
 
The use of the Fraud Act 2006 to criminalize in the commercial context has a number of 
advantages.  It carries a potentially robust sentence. As an offence deriving from the general 
part of criminal law, it is not restricted in terms of categories of potential defendants or 
victims, and because it is drafted in inchoate mode, unlike the predecessor deception 
offences, no actual loss or gain or exposure to loss needs to be proved. It is highly serviceable 
as a prosecution tool, simply drafted and accessible and its inchoate character means that it 
can be employed prior to the commission of any financial harm. Regrettably, it came into 
force on January 15th, 2007 and was therefore too late to make much of an impact there 
insofar as many of the seeds of the crisis had been sown long beforehand. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The overarching purpose of company law since its inception has been to address the 
persistent problem of scandal and fraud inherent in the nature of the company. A vast 
international – and potentially therefore very path dependent – regulatory infrastructure has 
been evolved in response, the costs of which may well now exceed the benefits. The case 
study of the contribution of OBSF to the 2008 financial crisis shows that the regulatory 
system was inadequate and may well remain inadequate whatever reforms are introduced, 
given the way in which market behaviour has responded to changes in regulation to date. 
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Economic theory suggests that a generic anti-fraud rule might well be the way forward. The 
law in force during the period up to the emergence of the banking crisis has been seen to have 
been in an extraordinary state of flux, with major reforms to company law, accounting 
regulation, financial services law and the criminal law taking place, especially towards the 
end of this period, all of which would have made prosecution of potential offences that might 
have taken place over years and straddled various regulatory regimes more difficult than 
otherwise.  Numerous distinct criminal offences that might have been available to a 
prosecutor during the period ending December 31st, 2007 were identified, summarised in 
Appendix 1. The most robust and serviceable provisions were all in effect generic fraud 
provisions. Section 2 Fraud Act, concerned with fraud by false representation, was potentially 
the most suited, but regrettably this would have only been available for conduct on or after 
January 15th, 2007 and therefore effectively unavailable. Similarly, the new general false 
statement offence under s. 1112 Companies Act might have been of assistance, particularly 
where no dishonesty can be shown, was only available on or after October 1st, 2009.  
Fraudulent trading under s. 458 Companies Act 1985 and/ or s. 993 Companies Act 2006 (on 
or after October 1st, 2007) might have proved sufficiently generic to be of assistance. Perhaps 
surprisingly another such provision might have been the common law offence of conspiracy 
to defraud, which had proven effective in the Victorian era in the Royal British Bank trial. In 
each case the maximum sentence available would have been 10 years’ imprisonment. We are 
not suggesting in this article that the use of OBSF prior to the banking crisis amounted to 
criminal conduct (there would have been many evidential and legal obstacles to any 
prosecution), only that the criminal law failed to perform its deterrent role on some socially 
damaging behaviour. 
 
While some will argue that the use of criminal offences based on fraud is too blunt an 
instrument and will discourage legitimate business activity, this ignores the part that might be 
played by markets in regulating themselves, albeit under the shadow of the criminal law, an 
example of which can be seen in the approach to the implementation of the Bribery Act. In 
the event that such rigorous prosecution is adopted, there would be much scope to dismantle 
much of the international and domestic company law regimes which would be unnecessary, 
their original purpose being satisfied in other ways. Not only would it signify a huge financial 
reduction in compliance costs, the substance over form approach would make the scrutiny of 
business activity subject to a common moral compass under the test of dishonesty.  
Regulation can be as detailed and as particularized as one may desire; however, it will always 
fail to address fraud because fraud is notoriously difficult to define. What distinguishes fraud 
as a criminal offence is that it is not an activity in itself; it is simply a way in which an 
otherwise lawful activity is performed.  What distinguishes lawful conduct from fraudulent 
conduct is not compliance or non-compliance with a legal rule – it is whether the conduct is 
done with accompanying “dishonesty”.  It is that characteristic that must surely place certain 
instances of accounts manipulation firmly within the ambit of the criminal law, and rightly 
so. The criminal law has a moral basis; it is about stigma and censure following conviction, 
and it is entirely appropriate that the provision of misleading information by companies 
should be deterred by it. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Summary table of relevant criminal offences applicable during the period January 1, 
2000 to January 1, 2008 
 
Description Statutory Effective Mens rea Need to Max 
34 
 
of offence authority  date  requirement? show 
victims? 
sentence 
Approving 
defective 
accounts 
s. 233(5) 
CA 1985 
(as 
amended 
s. 7 CA 
1989)  
 
Before 
November 
12, 2004 
Knowing or 
reckless as to 
non-compliance 
No Fine 
Approving 
defective 
accounts 
s. 233(5) 
CA 1985 
(as 
amended 
IAS Refs 
2004) 
November 
12, 2004 up 
to and 
including 
April 5, 2008 
(see also n. 
214 above) 
Knowing or 
reckless as to 
non-compliance 
No Fine 
False  
accounting 
s. 17 Theft 
Act 1968 
Throughout 
period 
Dishonesty & 
view to gain or 
cause loss; 
knowing it may 
be misleading 
No 7 yrs 
custodial 
General false 
statement 
offence 
s. 5 
Perjury 
Act 1911 
Throughout Knowingly 
makes false 
statement 
No 2 yrs 
custodial 
Misleading 
statements 
and practices 
offence 
s. 47(1) 
FSA 1986  
Before 
December 1, 
2001 
Knowing or 
reckless as to 
whether 
misleading 
No 2 yrs 
custodial 
Misleading 
statements 
and practices 
offence 
s. 397(1) 
and (2) 
FSMA 
2000 
On or after 
December 1, 
2001 
Knowing or 
reckless as to 
making 
misleading 
statement / 
dishonest 
concealment 
and intention to 
induce 
No 7 yrs 
custodial 
False 
statements by 
company 
directors 
s. 19 Theft 
Act 1968 
Throughout 
period 
Knowing it may 
be misleading, 
intention to 
deceive 
No 7 years 
custodial 
Fraud etc in 
anticipation of 
winding up 
 
s. 206 IA 
1986 
Throughout 
period 
Intention to 
defraud/conceal/ 
defeat the law 
No 7 years 
custodial 
Destroying / 
falsifying 
company 
books 
s. 209 IA 
1986 
Throughout 
period 
Intention to 
defraud/deceive 
No 7 years 
custodial 
Common law 
conspiracy to 
defraud 
Preserved 
by s. 5(2) 
Criminal 
Law Act 
1977 
Throughout 
period 
Dishonesty & 
intention to 
defraud 
No 10 years 
custodial 
35 
 
Obtaining 
property by 
deception 
s. 15 Theft 
Act 1968  
Before 
January 15, 
2007 
Dishonesty & 
intention to 
permanently 
deprive 
Yes 10 years 
custodial 
Obtaining 
pecuniary 
advantage by 
deception 
s. 16 Theft 
Act 1968  
Before 
January 15, 
2007 
Dishonesty Yes 5 years 
custodial 
Fraudulent 
trading 
s. 458 CA 
1985 
  
Before 
October 1, 
2007  
 
  
Intention to 
defraud/ 
fraudulent 
purpose 
No 7 years 
custodial 
 
Fraudulent 
trading 
s. 993 CA 
2006 
On or after 
October 1, 
2007 
Intention to 
defraud/ 
fraudulent 
purpose 
No 10 years 
custodial 
Fraud by false 
representation 
s. 2 Fraud 
Act 2006 
On or after 
January 15, 
2007 
Dishonesty & 
intention to 
make gain or 
cause loss 
No 10 years 
custodial 
Fraud by 
failure to 
disclose 
information 
s. 3 Fraud 
Act 2006 
On or after 
January 15, 
2007 
Dishonesty & 
intention to 
make gain or 
cause loss 
No 10 years 
custodial 
Fraud by 
abuse of 
position 
s. 4 Fraud 
Act 2006 
On or after 
January 15, 
2007 
Dishonesty & 
intention to 
make gain or 
cause loss 
No 10 years 
custodial 
 
